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Abstract 
This paper studies all equity firms and shows which are in US firms, the main drivers of zero-
debt policy. I analyze 6763 U.S. listed companies in years 1987-2009, a total of 77442 firms 
year. I find that financial constrained firms show a higher probability to become unlevered. In 
the opposite side, firms producing high cash flow are also likely to become unlevered, paying 
their debt. Some firms create economies of scale in the use of funds, increasing the probability 
of become unlevered. The industry characteristics are also important to explain the zero-debt 
policy. However is the high perception of risk, the most important factor influencing this 
extreme behavior, which is consistent with trade-off theory. 
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I - Introduction 
In the year 2005, 692 firms representing 20.2% of total firms with assets larger than $10m 
had zero outstanding debt, including both short and long-term debt, in their capital structure. In 
the same year, 49.8% or 1706 firms had negative debt, i.e. outstanding cash and short term 
investments was larger than total debt. Between 1987 and 2009, on average 14,1% of firms 
show no debt, 16.8% show zero long-term debt and 41% zero net debt. Looking to the evolution 
in Table 1, we see a stable rising trend with a maximum in 2005. This extreme debt aversion 
exists in all firm sizes being more frequent in smaller firms, it´s why Strebulaev and Yang 
(2006) call this, the puzzle of zero-leverage firms. We document the puzzle along various 
dimensions and put forward a number of reasonable explanations that can account for it.  
This research confirms and is related to the stylized fact that on average firms have low 
leverage ratios, relative to what we would expect from various models of capital structure. For 
example, Graham (2000) considers that a typical firm could double tax benefits by issuing debt 
until the marginal tax benefit begins to decline. Being so significant the number of zero leverage 
firms, the low leverage puzzle cannot be explained before we can understand why so many 
firms eschew any kind of debt.  
Many studies have examined changes in leverage, like Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
and Frank and Goyal (2003). Some studies examine changes in equity, like Fama and French 
(2005) and Leary and Roberts (2010). Frank and Goyal (2004) examine both changes in debt 
and changes in equity in a two-equation VAR System
1
. Changes in debt have played an 
important role in assessing the pecking order theory, because the financing deficit is supposed to 
drive debt according to this theory. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) examine how debt 
responds to short-term variation in investment and earnings and have found strong support for 
this prediction. Frank and Goyal (2003) examine the broad applicability of the pecking order 
theory. Their evidence based on a large cross-section of US publicly traded firms over long time 
periods, shows that external financing is heavily used by some firms. On average net equity 
issue track the financing deficit more closely than do net debt issue. These facts do not match 
the claims of the pecking order theory. Greatest support for pecking order is found among large 
firms, which might be expected to face the least severe adverse selection problem since they 
receive much better coverage by equity analysts. Even here, the support for pecking order is 
declining over time and the support for pecking order among large firms is weaker in the 1990s. 
                                                             
1 This is a very uncommon study using aggregate US data for 1952 to 2000 and based in a time series model. 
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Lemmon and Zender (2008) attempt to reconcile the findings presented by Fama and French 
(2002) and Frank and Goyal (2003), with those presented by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). 
These authors use the idea of debt capacity as an important instrument to understand the 
rejections of the pecking order theory. Consideration of debt capacity suggests that, when 
constrained by debt capacity, they issue equity, when unconstrained they issue debt. In a certain 
way if debt capacity is defined as the point when adding more leverage reduces firm value, then 
debt capacity is similar to the concept of target leverage by the trade-off theory and thus, finding 
that firms use debt to fill the financing deficit when they are below their debt capacity may not 
sharply distinguish the two theories of capital structure. Lemmon and Zender (2008) find, as 
expected, that the coefficient on financing deficit in net debt regressions are significantly larger 
for firms with rated debt and smaller for firms with no rating. They also show that firms with no 
debt ratings are small high-growth firms and they use equity to finance their deficits. These 
results are consistent with those in Fama and French (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2003). 
However Frank and Goyal suggest that these firms face more asymmetric information problems 
and thus pecking order predicts that they should issue equity. Lemmon and Zender suggest that 
these firms are debt capacity constrained and therefore issue equity. Halov and Heider (2006) 
argue when there is greater asymmetric information about risk, debt has more severe adverse 
selection problems and firms would only issue equity. To test these arguments, Halov and 
Heider use asset volatility as a proxy for asymmetric information about risk. They show that as 
asset volatility increases, firms use more equity to finance their deficits. 
Since at least Miller (1977), there has been some concern about seemingly low leverage of 
firms given the substantial tax benefits of debt. Graham (2000) finds that a significant number 
of Compustat firms are surprisingly conservative in their use of debt. These are generally large, 
profitable and liquid firms to which it is expect they face lower costs of financial distress. 
Almeida and Philippon (2007) point out that most debt conservatism calculations focus on 
expected costs of financial distress rather than the risk-adjusted costs of financial distress, thus 
distress risk premium can help explain why firms appear to use debt conservatively. Bankruptcy 
happens more commonly in bad times than in good times, so the lower debt levels can work like 
an insurance expense. Several recent papers attempt to reconcile the observed capital structures 
to those predicted by models. Minton and Wruck (2001) examine low leverage firms and find 
that the low leverage is largely transitory
2
. These firms appear to be stockpiling financial slack 
                                                             
2
 They define financial conservatism, as a persistent financial policy of low leverage in a five years period. A firm is 
classified as being financially conservative if its annual ratio of long- term debt, including the current portion, is in 
5 
 
or debt capacity, which is used later to make acquisitions and capital expenditures. Morellec 
(2004) presents a contingent claims model with manager-stockholder conflicts. The model can 
generate the low debt ratios observed in practice. In another paper, Ju et al. (2005) present a 
dynamic framework that provides estimates of optimal capital structures based on a calibrated 
contingent-claims model. They show that firms are not underlevered relative to the predictions 
of this model. Maximizing share value for a firm that is calibrated to be similar to the median 
Compustat firm results in an optimal debt-to-capital ratio of about 15%, which is below the 
median Compustat debt-to-capital value of about 23%. Their results contradict the view that 
firms are conservative in debt financing. Their results also show that moderate deviations of 
capital structure from optimal values have very small impact on firm value. In the presence of 
transaction costs, it may be optimal for firms to let their capital structure deviate from the target. 
Hennessy and Whited (2005) and Strebulaev (2007) also dispute the claim that firms are 
underlevered relative to the predictions of dynamic trade-off models. Their models also appear 
to be capable of accounting for observed corporate debt levels. 
Agrawal and Nagarajan (1990) focused their attention on firms that use no long-term debt 
over a continuous five-year period
3
, using equity ownership and executives data. The paper 
provides evidence that all-equity firms exhibit greater levels of managerial stockholdings, more 
extensive family relationships among top management, and higher liquidity positions than a 
matched sample of levered firms. 
Gardner and Trzcinka (1992) provides evidence that the trade-off theory of capital structure 
can predict the behavior of all-equity firms, using data from 1964 through 1983, choosing firms 
that had no interest payments and no long term debt for at least one year in the twenty years 
covered by Compustat data base. Using a Logit function they tested whether the trade-off theory 
of capital structure can describe the debt policy of all-equity firms by relating the probability of 
borrowing to variables that should proxy for leverage-related costs and benefits. The 
independent variables used were: alternative tax shield, risk and what they call Myers growth 
option measure and earnings per share ratio as growth option 2. The results show that growth 
option (market value of assets to book value of assets) is consistently a significant predictor of 
the probability of corporate borrowing. They conclude that the incentive to under invest in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
the bottom 20% of all firms for five consecutive years. The average debt ratio over total assets, of low leverage firms 
was 0.0276 against 0.2932 for control firms. Seventy percent of low leverage firms drop their conservative financial 
policy and almost 50% do so within five years. 
3
 They have defined levered firms as firms which maintain a ratio of book value of long term debt to firm value 
(market value of equity plus book value of long-term debt) of at least 5%. 
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presence of risky debt appears to influence the borrowing activities of these firms. This finding 
is consistent with Bradley, Jarrel and Kim (1984). In addition, contrary to the Bradley, Jarrel 
and Kim results, firm risk is found to be positively related to the probability of a firm shifting 
from all-equity to debt. Nondebt tax shields are positive and significant in the five-year sub 
periods. 
Strebulaev and Yang (2006) contrary to Gardner and Trzcinka (1992) have select only non-
financial and no utilities US firms
4
. They found that zero-leverage firms are on average slightly 
smaller than their proxies. They have a higher market-to-book ratio, higher cash balance, 
profitability, higher tax bill, and conditional on paying dividends, they pay substantially larger 
dividend than their dividend-paying proxies, so that the total payout ratio is similar among the 
two groups. 
The aim of this study is to extend previous studies in this topic, using a broad sample of non-
financial and no utilities US firms. Our approach to discriminate levered firms against unlevered 
firms is based on Logit regressions, following Gardner and Trzcinka (1992), but using different 
variables and different models
5
. The variables considered are proxies for the following main 
factors: risk, financial constraints, cash flow production, growth opportunities, profitability, 
agency costs of debt, market timing and scale in the use of funds. At the same time, going 
beyond industry fixed effects, I try to capture the industry effect using some observed variables. 
The results confirm the prediction about the negative relation between risk and leverage. 
Being the risk of assets a proxy for bankruptcy costs, my findings reconcile not only this 
negative relation but give an understanding that in certain circumstances, zero-debt policy can 
be optimal. Other things equal, and being the effect of risk reflected in the probability of 
shifting to unlevered position multiplied by three, we can understand why we find so many 
firms unlevered. This finding reconciles somehow with trade-off theory, but requires us to 
consider a detail; even without debt there are bankruptcy costs. Debt my increase costs of 
financial distress and the weight of bankruptcy costs can be in certain circumstances extremely 
important, offsetting entirely the benefits of tax shields. When trying to capture the industry 
effect one of the most important factor is also related with the agency cost of debt. 
                                                             
4
 They have constructed for each zero-leverage firm two reference sets of proxy firms that serve as control 
observations. Each set has up to four firm-observations in the same year and industry (as defined by the three-digit 
SIC code) which are closest in size. 
5 Gardner and Trzcinka (1992) use yearly regressions. We use panel data models. 
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On the other hand, results show two different types of unlevered firms: debt constrained 
firms and those that are more profitable and paying dividends, for which risk also discourage 
the use of debt. The last one, following a pecking order style, accumulating profits over 
financing needs, become unlevered paying existing debt. 
From the demand side, the amount of funds used in the operation is also negatively related 
with the probability of become unlevered. At industry level, the measure that proxy for value 
added, also confirms this intuition and it is consistent with higher presence of unlevered firms in 
service industries when comparing with manufacturing. This also favors what I call pecking 
order style, with incidence not in positive components of financing deficit but in the investing 
needs. 
This research offers some contributions to this puzzle but not a complete explanation. The 
nonuse of debt in capital structure can be a decision made by managers or an inevitability, 
depending on shareholders and other contingences. The all-equity capital structure can depend 
from company situation, managers’ experience and mentality, shareholders preferences, agency 
conflicts (see Agrawal and Nagarajan 1990) and almost of this potential influences are not 
reflected in the financial statements or combined, at least at this magnitude with 77,442 firms 
year. When we remove firm fixed effects we get only those covariates that are common and we 
leave reflected in the firm dummy all other specific factors not observed. So to increase the 
explanatory power of my model, that is based on fixed effects, it will be necessary to joint 
observed variables related with managers, shareholders and agency conflicts. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: the following section provides data description, 
measures and some detailed statistics, section III presents empirical tests and results, section IV 
robustness and additional tests and section V concludes.  
II - Data and Methodology 
A. Data and sample selection 
In this study we use accounting information from Compustat Xpressfeed for US
6
 publicly-
traded companies, over the period 1987-2009. I collect market returns from CRSP US stock 
databases. I have used two other sources of data: Marginal Tax Rates
7
, and Compustat 
                                                             
6 Current ISO country code-incorporation equal to USA 
7
 Data bases with marginal tax rates from 1980 to 2007, included in Compustat and accessed through Wharton 
Research Data Services (Wrds). These rates correspond to the non-parametric marginal tax rates developed  by 
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Segments
8
.  The periodicity is annual and each record represents a company fiscal year, which 
is an accounting period of twelve months. Fiscal years do not necessarily correspond to calendar 
years. As usual in this kind of studies, we exclude financial companies (SIC 6000-6999), 
utilities or regulated (SIC 4900-4999). We dropped non-US companies, non-publicly traded 
firms and subsidiaries (stock ownership codes 1, 2, 3 or 4) and kept only stock ownership 0, 
corresponding to publicly traded, including NYSE, ASE/AMEX/Alternex and NASDAQ. We 
also excluded all firm year with zero sales and zero total assets or missing values in these two 
variables. Based on average total assets by firm, I dropped all firms with total book assets lower 
than 10 million USD, following Strebulaev and Yang (2006). In order to ensure more stability 
to the sample, I require a minimum of three years in database, having excluded firms with 
ephemeral presence. 
  All nominal values are converted into year 2009 dollar values using CPI index from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor. We have started in 1987 
because we also require the observations to have Cash-Flow Statement information. Effective 
for fiscal years ending July 15, 1988 the SFAS #95 requires US companies to report the 
Statement of Cash Flow. Prior to adoption of SFAS #95, companies may have report other 
information formatting. In the paper "date t" always refers to fiscal year t and market value 
refers to common shares outstanding times price close annual fiscal year. We also require that 
debt in current liabilities reconcile with total current liabilities and long term debt and debt in 
current liabilities reconcile with total liabilities. This leaves us with an unbalanced panel of 
77442 firm-year observations, from a minimum of 2636 in 1989 to a maximum of 4110 in 1996. 
To deal with outliers in variables used in regressions, we decide winsorize each tail at 0.5%. For 
instance, some variables that are ratios can assume in some cases a value that is several orders 
of magnitude too large to be plausibly correct.  
 
B. Measures 
I could use many concepts to qualify as unlevered or quasi unlevered firm. Nevertheless, I 
have chosen the zero net debt (ZNETD). The firm is classified as ZNETD if the amount of cash 
and short-term investments (CHE) is greater than the sum of short-term debt (DLC) with long-
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Professors Jennifer Blouin, John Core and Wayne Guay in the article: Have the Tax Benefits of Debt Been 
Overestimated?, Journal of Financial Economics, 2010,  98(2); 195-213. 
8
 Independent database included in Compustat product, and accessed through Wharton Research Data Services 
(Wrds). 
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term debt (DLTT). Following Strebulaev and Yang (2006) the rationale for considering net debt 
is that, from certain standpoints (e.g. Trade-off theory), cash can be viewed as negative debt. 
These firms have on average a marginal debt presence in their capital structure and from an 
economic standpoint can still be thought of as averse to debt. At the same time, standard 
valuation models subtract the amount of cash in the firm´s Balance Sheet from the value of 
outstanding debt in order to determine the firm´s leverage. Despite the dominant practice of 
financial analysts in viewing cash as the “negative” of debt, as Acharya et al. (2007) show, 
firms may prefer higher cash to lower debt, depending of their needs to hedge future 
investments in a situation of financial constraint. There are surely several reasons to maintain 
this situation, flexibility (see Graham and Harvey, 2001), transaction motives, but firms in this 
situation still be thought as adverse to debt. Column 4 of Table I reports the fraction of ZNETD 
relative to the total size of the sample in each year and shows an average of 41% in this period, 
from a minimum of 29.6% in 1989 to a maximum 49.8% in 2005. In Table I there are 
alternative concepts of zero debt and we can see a rising trend from the first year of the sample. 
We can see also a maximum in 2005 following a decreasing period until a turning point in 2008. 
The evolution in 2007, 2008 and 2009 is partially artificial and caused by applying the sample 
selection criteria that imposes minimum three year presence. In consequence there are not new 
firms in the last three years. The new unlevered firms each year in the databases, represents 
almost 3% on average. 
 
C. Factors and characteristics that can be used to explain zero-leverage 
behavior 
Tax benefits 
Theory predicts that firms with low marginal tax rate on their interest deductions are less 
likely to finance new investments with debt. MacKie-Mason (1990) comments that the reason 
why many studies fail to find plausible or significant tax effects on capital structure, is because 
the debt-equity ratios are the cumulative result of multiple and separate decisions and most tax 
shields have a negligible effect on the marginal tax rate for most firms. MacKie-Mason (1990) 
use tests based on incremental decisions and argue that tax shields matter only through their 
effect on the firms’ marginal tax rate. On the other hand DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) have 
developed the idea that non-debt tax shields can also influence debt policy. Thus using only 
marginal tax rate we may lose some tax influence on debt policy, although tax loss carry 
10 
 
forwards and investment tax credits can be factors that are reflected in the marginal tax rates. 
MacKie-Mason (1990) found that firms with tax loss carry forwards are unlike to be able to use 
interest deductions. In contrast, firms with investment tax credits, are often profitable and 
paying taxes, so on average investment tax credits does not reduce the probability of a debt 
issue. 
The marginal tax rate before interest deductions provide by Blouin et al. (2010) is used to 
measure tax effect on the probability of shifting to an unlevered capital structure
9
. These authors 
re-examine the claim that many corporations are underleveraged and that they fail to take full 
advantage of debt tax shields. They conclude that when expected distress costs and difficult-to-
measure non-debt tax shields are also considered it appears plausible that most firms have tax-
efficient capital structures.  
Financial Constraints 
 Size is supposed to be negatively correlated with the probability of bankruptcy, see Ohlson 
(1980). Static trade-off theory is generally interpreted as predicting that large firms will have 
more debt since larger firms are more diversified and have lower default risk. Larger firms are 
also typically more mature firms. These firms have a reputation in debt markets and 
consequently face lower agency costs of debt. Hence the trade-off theory predicts that leverage 
and firm size should be positively related. 
The pecking order theory is usually interpreted as predicting an inverse relation between 
leverage and firm size. The argument is that large firms have around longer and are better 
known. Thus, large firms face lower adverse selection and can more easily issue equity 
compared to small firms where adverse selection problems are severe. Cross sectional tests of 
the relation between leverage and firm size find the relation to be robustly positive. Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), follow this line of reasoning and argue that larger firms tend to disclose more 
information to outside investors than smaller ones.  
Age share with size some of the above arguments, mainly the asymmetric information 
problem. Age and the size of assets show some correlation, meaning that older firms tend to be 
bigger. These to variables proxy also for risk and can be used like financial constraint criteria, as 
is done in Almeida et al. (2004), who defines the two groups of constrained and unconstrained 
                                                             
9 Marginal tax rates are available until 2007. After 2007 they were complemented with average tax rate. 
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firms, based on asset size deciles. Also, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) have find size and age as 
particularly useful predictors of financial constraints levels, they consider these two variables as 
relatively exogenous firm characteristics. The only problem is some positive correlation 
between each other
10
. 
The natural logarithm of booked assets is used instead of an alternative measure also used 
for many authors, the natural logarithm of sales, in order to avoid some increased correlation 
among variables. Usually the natural logarithm of sales and total assets are highly correlated, in 
my sample the correlation coefficient is 0,8975. Using natural logarithm of total assets I’m 
assuming a nonlinear relation between size and the probability of become unlevered. For age
11
 I 
use the number of years between the observation year and the first year the firm appears in 
Compustat file. 
I use also a dummy to identify firms with negative EBITDA for the last two years. Being 
the unlevered status more a discrete than a continuous decision this variable is supposed to be 
correlated with financial distress. Firms exhibiting two years of negative EBITDA are supposed 
to have limited debt capacity. I follow Ohlson (1980) who have used last 2 years of negative net 
income, as covariate do forecast bankruptcy.   
Another variable used is a dummy that define if a firm is a start-up. These firms can face 
severe agency costs of debt, independently of age. Firms classified in this category, are no 
necessarily firms in the first year. I define start-up as firms in the lowest quintile of sales over 
assets ratio, in their industry, by year. Like the previous dummy, can be considered an extreme 
situation, but what I want to explain is also an extreme debt aversion. 
Profitability  
Static trade-off theory predicts that profitable firms should have more debt. Expected 
bankruptcy costs are lower and interest tax shields are more valuable for profitable firms. 
Furthermore, firms that generate higher profits relative to investment, can benefit from the 
discipline that debt provides, in mitigating the free cash-flow problem (see Jensen,1986). 
According to the pecking order theory, with investments and dividends fixed, more profitable 
firms should become less levered over time. Titman and Wessels (1988) and others, find that 
                                                             
10 In my data, the correlation coefficient between age and  size of 0,48. 
11 Hadlock and Pierce (2010) use a similar measure: the number of years preceding, the observation year that the firm 
has a nonmissing stock price on the Compustat file. 
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firms with higher past profits tend to have lower debt ratios. This evidence is also consistent 
with tax, transaction cost and adverse selection arguments that imply that internally generated 
equity is less costly than equity capital raised externally. The empirical studies typically find a 
negative relation between profitability and leverage, consistent with the pecking order theory 
and inconsistent with the trade-off theory. Regarding the probability to become unlevered, I 
expect a mixed behavior. 
In this study, profitability will be defined as earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) scaled 
by total assets, as in the majority of empirical studies. Looking at figure 2, graphically the 
relation with zero-debt policy approaches no to a U shape. Unprofitable segments of firms show 
a higher presence of all-equity firms as well the higher profitable ones, regardless their size or 
industry. In front of this situation we can ask, why so many unprofitable firms have been all-
equity firms and why so many high profitable ones, have been also all-equity firms? 
For the first question we can argue that unprofitable firms don't produce tax shields and 
have higher agency costs of debt, but even for some levels of positive Return on Investment 
(ROI), the presence of debt can reduce firm value. Considering Return on Equity (ROE) one of 
the most important and used highlights about firm performance, we can make the following 
decomposition: 
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As we can see, the Return on Equity (ROE) and consequently firm value is influenced 
positively by debt as predicted by trade-off theory. The same positive relation we have with the 
profitability of assets in place (ROI) or operating performance. In the case of poor operating 
performance, in low levels of ROI, but positive, the spread (ROI-rD) can be negative and 
discourage the use of debt, although there are tax savings. Thus we can conclude that managers 
of firms with low ROI, below cost of debt, have an incentive to keep away from debt. 
Regarding firms with negative ROI, their stockholders would have something to gain with debt, 
but debtholders realize that have huge agency costs because these firms don't generate enough 
cash-flow to pay interest and repay principal. Only when ROI is greater than rD we expect that 
trade-off theory applies and tax shields can balance against bankruptcy costs. 
Explanations to high frequency of all-equity firms in high levels of operating performance 
can be understandable using this factor, if these firms are so profitable, that shareholders have 
no other better alternatives to invest their funds.   
I have given some intuition, to better understand the mixed relation we can find with 
profitability. Empirically it is difficult to test the spread (ROI- rD) for the following reasons; the 
availability of debt cost by firm and the timing for these expectations. Alternatively I have 
included the EBIT as a covariate and a dummy that is highly correlated with high levels of 
profitability: dummy for positive financing deficit. At the same time I had already included a 
dummy for two years of negative EBITDA to control for the low levels of profitability. 
Profitability, using all of these features, works as a financial constraint and as source of free 
cash flow.  
Asset structure 
Tangibility is considered a relevant variable to explain cross sectional differences in 
leverage. The relation between tangibility and leverage should be positive. This prediction 
comes from Jensen and Meckling (1976) arguments. Tangible assets are easier to collateralize 
and they suffer a small loss of value when firms go into distress. Thus from a trade-off 
perspective, tangibility has an important effect on the costs of financial distress. In addition, 
tangibility makes it difficult for shareholders to substitute high-risk assets for low risk ones. 
Agency costs of debt are therefore lower for firms with more tangible assets. Under the pecking 
order we see opposite predictions. Harris and Raviv (1991) argue that the low information 
asymmetry associated with tangible assets makes equity less costly, resulting in a negative 
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relation between leverage and tangibility. This ambiguity under the pecking order theory stems 
from the fact that tangibility can be viewed as a proxy for different economic forces, allowing 
collateralization, helps the use of debt, reducing information asymmetry helps the use of equity. 
In most empirical studies the relation between debt and tangibility of assets is reliably positive: 
Friend and Lang (1988), Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Huang and 
Song (2006) and Frank and Goyal (2009), among others. Tangibility of assets is typically 
measured by the ratio of fixed assets over total assets. 
It’s important to stress some crucial aspects to understand this variable in the context of all-
equity firms: 1) the majority of this studies in capital structure drop all-equity firms in the 
sample selection, 2) some of them use averages along period, as dependent and independent 
variables, 3) some other are based on panel data samples but use pooled regressions even 
adjusting with clustered standard errors, or in alternative Fama Mcbeth approach. Assuming 
some stability in firm assets structure, the early findings and relation may not be valid in this 
kind of empirical study. If tangibility of assets doesn’t change significantly in time series, it may 
not contribute to discriminate against levered and unlevered firms in a within regression.  
The use of funds can determine financial needs and alternative sources; external or internal 
financing. The demand of funds comes from the investment side and working capital needs. 
Firms have different business structures, different strategies and positioning, are located in very 
specific industries. All of these characteristics imply a different asset structure. Firms located in 
service industries are likely to have lower components of working capital, especially funds 
invested in inventories and credit from suppliers. For these firms, people may be the most 
important asset. Conversely, in manufacturing industries, not only property plant and 
equipment, but also working capital, tend to be more valuable in terms of total book assets. 
The needs of external finance will be determined mainly by new investments either in fixed 
assets either in working capital or even in intangible assets
12
, together with the profit level. If 
the needs grow quickly, CFO’s, according to the pecking order theory, will use internal finance 
first and in a second step if available, debt financing. The intangibles recognized as book assets, 
as far as I know, have not been used as covariate to explain leverage. Usually they are 
considered not having collateralization characteristics. So, follow agency theory it doesn’t favor 
debt issue. Considering that ¾ of intangible assets in Compustat firms is goodwill, It’s not clear 
                                                             
12 Myers (1977) notes the difference between growth opportunities and intangibles assets recognized as book assets.  
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that there is no relation, between goodwill
13
 and debt. On the other hand, the remaining 
components of intangibles can be among others; patents and other rights that may sign the 
beginning of the production phase of new products. In previous stages the firms have spent 
money in research and development and the future value of this growth options only could be 
recognize by the market value of stocks. When becomes possible to recognize some of these 
intangible assets, we are in a more advanced stage, and firms need funds to invest in the 
production. Even if the firm doesn’t have activities of direct research and development and buy 
patents from other firm, these assets don’t have more asymmetric information then fixed assets. 
They are also assets in place, thus it can make sense the intuition that it should be a positive 
relation between intangibles and leverage. Consequently, we should also expect a positive 
influence from intangibles recognized as book assets, in the probability of borrowing.    
Volatility 
Volatility or business risk is a proxy for the probability of financial distress. Many authors 
have suggested that firm's optimal debt is a decreasing function of the volatility of earnings, 
because firms with more volatile cash flows face higher expected costs of financial distress and 
should use less debt. Ross (1985) have used beta as a measure of risk and argue that there is a 
relationship between the capital structure of the firm and risk. This negative relation was found 
in the absence of any bankruptcy costs or any agency, asymmetric information or signaling 
effects. More volatile cash flows reduce the probability that tax shields will be fully utilized, 
thus higher risk should result and less debt, under the trade-off theory.  
Another interpretation for risk, measured with standard deviation of stock prices, is based in 
the assumption that it is a positive function of the value of the growth option. Thus, the value of 
a call option over the firm’s assets increases with risk. Following the predictions about growth 
opportunities we can argue that firms with higher value of growth option should have lower 
debt and thus a positive relationship with the probability of shifting to an unlevered capital 
structure.  
Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that only the standard deviation of the percentage change 
in operating income can be a good proxy because is not affected by the firm's debt. Booth et al. 
(2001) and Huang and Song (2006) use standard deviation of earnings before interest and tax 
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 Goodwill comes mainly from mergers and acquisitions and we know that in some deals, new debt is issued to 
finance these restructuring operations. 
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scaled by total assets. In all-equity studies, Gardner and Trzcinka (1992) use the standard 
deviation of stock returns and beta. I don’t agree with measures that can already include the 
effect of existing debt. I share with Titman and Wessels (1988) this concern and I have chosen 
the standard deviation of assets. First, I computed the standard deviation of stock returns using 
daily data from CRSP and after, following Hillegeist et al. (2004) I adjusted this measure for 
debt-equity ratio in the case of levered firms
14
. 
I use a second variable as a proxy for risk, following Wu et al. (2010); the number of 
segments each firm operates. According to Myers (1977) one alleged advantage of corporate 
diversification is that diversified firms can borrow more. More diversification may mean lower 
risk. Following portfolio theory, the combination of assets with less than perfectly correlated 
returns originates a lower volatility, than the weighted average variance of all assets, due to 
compensation effect. I use the Compustat segments and I have considered as new segment either 
a different business (product/service) or a different location (geographic criteria). 
Investment Opportunities 
The static trade-off theory predicts a negative relation between leverage and growth. 
Growth firms lose more of their value when they go into distress. Several agency theories also 
predict a negative relation between leverage and growth. For firms lacking investment 
opportunities, debt serves to limit the agency costs of managerial discretion as suggested by 
Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990). Berger et al. (1997) also confirm that there is an association 
between managerial entrenchment and firm capital structure with results suggesting the 
disciplinary role of debt.  
On the other hand, debt also has its own agency cost. As growth options increase, asset 
substitution problems also become more severe. In high growth firms, it is easier for 
stockholders to increase project risk and it is harder for debt holders do detect such changes. 
Thus debt is more costly for firms with high growth opportunities. For example, the 
underinvestment problem is more severe for growth firms leading these firms to prefer less debt. 
The underinvestment problem arises because firms with risky debt have an incentive to under 
invest in positive net present value projects since shareholders bear the entire cost of the project 
but receive only a fraction of the increase in firm value. In this case the discipline that debt 
provides is less valuable for firms with good growth opportunities. In summary, both trade-off 
                                                             
14 Hillegeist et al. (2004) use the Black-Scholes option pricing model in forecasting the probability of bankruptcy. 
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and the agency theories are generally interpreted as predicting an inverse relation between the 
leverage ratio and growth opportunities. By contrast, the pecking order theory predicts that 
firms with more investments - holding profitability fixed - should accumulate more debt over 
time. Thus according to the pecking order theory, growth opportunities and leverage are 
expected to be positively related. In my opinion, firms with more investments might not be the 
same as firms with high growth opportunities. Investments are past while growth opportunities 
are future and were past investments, the basic reason for the rise of funds. 
The relation between leverage and growth features is negative in many different cross-
sectional studies including those by Bradley et al. (1984), Kim and Sorensen (1986), Smith and 
Watts (1992), Huang and Song (2006) and Frank and Goyal (2009). Other studies across 
countries such as Booth et al. (2001), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Alves and Ferreira (2007) 
predominantly have arrived to the same findings.  
In the capital structure literature, have been used several proxies for growth opportunities. 
Booth et al. (1988) use market-to-book ratio of equity
15
. Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Huang 
and Song (2006) use Tobin’s Q. Others such Wald (1999) uses a 5-year average of sales growth, 
Titman and Wessels (1988) use capital expenditures over total assets as well as research and 
development scaled by sales. Gardner and Trzcinka  (1992) use two measures for growth option 
as proxies for the agency costs of debt, the market value of assets to book value (growth option 
1) as well the end-of-year earnings/price ratio (growth option 2). Kim and Sorensen (1986) have 
used another proxy, the EBITGROW
16
 based in the argument that firms that experience high 
degrees of earnings growth are indeed more entrepreneurial in their investing opportunities. 
Kester (1986) have used as growth variable the compound average annual rate of growth in 
revenues
17
. I follow the arguments of those that consider Tobin’s Q (market-to-book ratio of 
total assets) the best measure to proxy for future growth opportunities. 
Market timing 
Market timing is having a renewed surge of popularity in the academic literature. In 
surveys, such as those by Graham and Harvey (2001), managers continue to offer at least some 
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 If the market timing theory applies, a higher market-to-book ratio should reduce leverage as firms exploit equity 
mispricing through equity issuances. Furthermore, if we use a market-based leverage ratio, a mechanical negative 
relation may exist between leverage and market-to-book ratio. 
16
 The geometric mean annual growth rate in EBIT during ten years 
17
 Kester (1986) is one of the only studies to find a positive relation with debt. It can be a logic finding, taking in 
consideration the past growth experience of his proxy for growth opportunities and the arguments of pecking order 
theory. 
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support for the idea. In accordance with market timing behavior, firms tend to issue equity 
following a stock price run-up. Some studies that analyze long-run stock returns following 
corporate financing events have found evidence consistent with market timing
18
. Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) argue that capital structure is best understood as the cumulative effect of past 
attempts to time the market. 
The main idea of market timing theory is that when they need financing, managers look at 
current conditions in both debt and equity markets choosing the more favorable. If neither 
market looks favorable, they may defer issuances. Conversely, if current market conditions look 
unusually favorable, managers will issue funds, even if the firm has no need for funds currently. 
The basic assumption of this theory, is that stock returns and debt market conditions play a 
central role in financial decisions and consequently on firms capital structure. 
In this paper I don’t want to confirm or not market timing theory. I use a dummy variable 
(Equity issues) in order to define if the firm has issued net equity and if equity issued is higher 
than debt issued in the same period. The aim of this dummy is to find if the shift in capital 
structure is the outcome of a managerial decision. 
Managers overconfidence 
Hovakimian et al. (2001) examine firm financing choices and find that more profitable 
firms have on average lower leverage ratios. In addition they find also that firms with higher 
current stock prices (relative to their past stock prices) are more likely to issue equity rather than 
debt and repurchase debt rather than equity. I use a variable that is not the same of Hovakimian 
(2001). The variable is the excess return during last two years, using CRSP value weighted 
index. One can expect that managers are convinced that unlevered capital structure is better 
remunerated by investors. So I will investigate if the abnormal return has any influence, and in 
what sense, on the probability of firms change to a zero-debt policy. 
Industry factors 
According to Frank and Goyal (2009), industry differences in leverage ratios have several 
possible meanings. The first is that managers may use industry benchmarks to decide about their 
own leverage level. Thus, following this line of reasoning some authors have used industry 
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 The evidence that equity issuers have low subsequent abnormal returns shows up in a number of studies (see, e.g. 
Loughan and Ritter (1995); Jegadeesh (2000)). Baker and Wurgler (2000) find low returns on the stock market 
following heavy aggregate stock issuance. 
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median leverage as a proxy for target capital structure. Hovakimian et al. (2001) provide 
evidence that the deviation of actual leverage from the industry mean is highly significant in 
firm’s choice between debt and equity issues. Frank and Goyal (2009) have find evidence that 
median industry leverage is one of the most important factors, explaining the market leverage. 
In my study I have a dichotomous dependent variables, so I don’t think that median industry 
leverage could be an acceptable factor to explain the probability of change from one extreme 
position to another
19
.  
Another interpretation is that industry effects reflect a set of correlated, but otherwise 
omitted factors. Hovakimian (2004) have included industry leverage as independent variable to 
control for omitted factors. Follow this way of thinking that industry factors are important to 
firm financial structure, some other researchers remove industry fixed effects by including 
dummy variables and using the remaining variation to test how firm characteristics affect 
financial policy. In both situations, these two approaches don’t tell us how industry affects firm 
financial structure. It’s why I follow Mackay and Phillips (2005) trying to find how important 
are industry factors to unlevered financial structures and what industry factors can influence the 
likelihood of a firm to become unlevered. 
Usually one may think that the low leverage phenomenon appears associated with internet 
and computer business. Already Titman and Wessels (1988) have suggested that firms making 
products requiring the availability of specialized servicing and spare parts may recognize high 
bankruptcy costs. In consequence, firms operating in these industries should be more 
conservative in the use of debt. They have included a dummy variable to identify firms with SIC 
codes between 3400 and 4000 and got statistically significance, so have concluded for the 
evidence of this conjecture.  
The level of R&D expenses can be considered as a firm characteristic. Titman and Wessels 
(1988) have used this variable as a proxy for uniqueness
20
. The idea is that firms that produce 
unique or specialized products probably suffer high bankruptcy costs. R&D expenses create 
intangible assets that are growth opportunities, in contrast with assets in place. Frank and Goyal 
                                                             
19 The use of median industry, looking to this variable as a benchmark, makes sense when using leverage ratios as 
dependent variable and when we are looking for explanations to leverage adjustments.   
20 The uniqueness attribute is expected to be negatively related to the observed debt ratio because of its positive 
correlation with non-debt tax shields and its negative correlation with collateral value. Research and development 
and some selling expenses, such as advertising, can be considered capital goods that are immediately expensed and 
cannot be used as collateral. 
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(2009) have also used this variable at firm level without getting statistical relevance. Harris and 
Raviv (1991) have also documented a negative relation between leverage and R&D expenses. 
At industry level, we can lessen the effect of lack of data that exists in database, for which, 
usually the authors attempt to solve by putting zeros in the missing values. Calculating an 
average by industry by year, we can avoid the adverse effect of yearly changes in this kind of 
expenses. Since it is important to note that the R&D past expenses retain their effects in the 
present, even for those firms that have cut or reduce expenses in a particular year. 
I define industry following Fama and French (1997) approach using four-digit SIC codes to 
assign firms to 48 industries. The four variables, industry R&D intensity, renewal ratio, value 
added and concentration, were computed using the 48 industries. All of this ratios were also 
computed year by year, despite their relatively little time variation. The computation was done 
before applying the sample selection criteria, namely size and permanence criteria. 
Regarding the renewal ratio I can have some problems because I use the number of new 
firms by year by industry and the number of disappearing firms. All this information comes 
from Compustat file. We can always think that probably the appearance in file is slower that the 
disappearance, comparing with the real beginning or end of business. This ratio can proxy for 
future industry growth. 
The variable, industry concentration is defined by the percentage of sales in industry and by 
year, that comes from the 30% of biggest corporations. It is a proxy for the competition 
intensity. 
The variables that proxy for industry value added will differentiate industries with different 
prevailing activities, like: based on service; trading activities, manufacturing, etc.  In any case 
this proxy have some imperfections because we don´t have available the raw material cost. This 
variable is related with the business demand side of funds and I expect a positive influence in 
the probability of shifting to an unlevered position. 
Leverage and Macroeconomic Conditions 
  Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) show that subsequent to recessions induced by monetary 
contractions, aggregate net debt issues increase for large firms but remain stable for small firms. 
During expansions, stock prices go up and expected bankruptcy costs go down, taxable income 
goes up, and cash increases and thus firms borrow more during expansions, following tradeoff 
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theory. Conversely if pecking order holds, is not clear if leverage should decline or increase. 
During expansions, investment increases and financing debt may be higher, thus debt should 
increase, but in good times operating cash flow increases and internal equity should raise.  
 In this study I have always remove year effects, introducing year dummies, in order to 
eliminate the influence of macroeconomic conditions in the behavior of the independent 
variables. Proceeding this way we ensure that our conclusions are timeless. 
D. Methodology 
I test if all equity firms are constrained by debt capacity and facing this situation, they 
abstain from issuing debt for their capital structure. The variables used to test this hypothesis 
are: age, size, a dummy for negative EBITDA and a dummy defining if the firm is a start-up. 
Age, size and the dummy start-up, proxy mainly for asymmetric information. Asymmetric 
information problem can be more severe with debt in small and young firms. Size can also 
create barriers to debt issue, due to transaction costs. If the firm presents negative EBITDA, 
shows limited capacity to repay principal and interest to bondholders. Thus this low profitability 
situation can work also as a barrier to debt issue. 
In the other hand, if the firm has a good operating performance and show a positive 
financing deficit
21
, is likely to become unlevered due to the tendency of managers to maintain or 
delay the exit of funds, accelerating equity growth. In this situation is expected that managers 
pay existing debt, total or partially, reserving debt capacity. 
The use of funds can determine financial needs and alternative sources, external or internal 
financing. The determinants of funds come from the investment side and working capital needs. 
Firms have different business structures, different strategies and positioning, are located in very 
specific industries and all of these characteristics implies a different asset structure. The needs 
of external finance will be determined mainly by new investments either in fixed assets or in 
working capital together with the profit level. If the needs grow quickly, CFO’s, according to 
the pecking order theory, will use internal finance first and in a second step financial debt. In 
consequence, if the firm was not, becomes levered. So the rate of assets increase is crucial, 
because the firm even showing good performance can be obliged to use external finance. 
Conversely, firms working with low days sales outstanding (DSO), low levels of inventories 
                                                             
21 Financing deficit = Operating activities, net cash-flow  - Capital expenditures - Acquisitions 
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and not capital intensive, can increase their business having a lower impact in financing needs. 
Increasing business implies cash flow production and together creates favorable conditions to 
increase the likelihood of internal funds to be enough, reducing the demand of external 
financing.   
If the needs of funds are offset by internal cash-flow and there are not any financing deficit, 
the CFO’s in the first moment can distribute special dividends or not, but his problem, 
depending of business strategy, is always what to do with the excess cash. One possibility is to 
invest in short term or long term investments in a kind of reserve to bad times or for future 
investments, distribute some money to shareholders and maintaining some debt in capital 
structure. Another possibility is to cancel all its liabilities, whether to invest certain amounts in 
short or long term investments and to distribute some money for shareholders. In this situation 
the firm is also apparently wasting money, not using debt to minimize income taxes, but it can 
be understandable is the shareholders have not any better chance to invest their money.  
The level of risk can also be an explanation to the absence of debt, since the presence of 
debt increases the bankruptcy costs. I follow somehow the idea that total risk has two 
components or two origins: assets and debt. If we start with a moderate risk of assets, the firm 
can use some debt in its capital structure, increasing its value with tax shields according to 
Modigliani and Miller and trade-off theory predictions. If firm increases the level of risk in its 
assets, the presence of debt may become not optimal and unwanted. In this study two variables 
are used as proxies for risk to test this hypothesis: standard deviation of assets and number of 
segments.  
Other hypothesis can be posed to justify the unlevered capital structure: growth 
opportunities, market timing, marginal tax rates and managers overconfidence. Bankruptcy can 
be costly for these firms having future growth. On the other hand, we can argue that the 
unlevered position can be consequence of misevaluation and the attempt to time the market. 
Additionally, some firms cannot have tax incentives to use debt, or managers can perceive a 
positive feedback from the market. In the opposite situation we can argue that some strategic 
decisions like mergers and acquisitions can be the cause to relevant changes in capital structure. 
A Logit regression model is used to examine the relationship between the probability of a 
firm's switch, S, from levered to unlevered, conditional on a vector of explanatory independent 
variables, X. This relationship can be expressed as: 
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Where both α and β′ are parameters estimated from the sample data. Firstly I try to find out 
which variables are statistically significant and what is its contribution to model’s goodness of 
fit. In a second step I use together the relevant variables and X, is a vector of explanatory 
variables, include measures of profitability, risk, financial constraints, growth opportunities, 
taxes and others.  
Regarding the data and econometric methods we have a sample of 77,442 firms year from 
1987 to 2009. We have an unbalanced panel data with 23 years data but where the number of 
years by firm is variable, ranging from 3 to 23 years. Some of the firms don’t change their 
situation, regarding their status in terms of leverage classification. Most of them show some 
consistence over time, leading us to the conclusion that there is some correlation in time series 
in the dependent variable. In this situation it makes sense to use the fixed-effects model to 
analyze and search the variables that can be important to estimate the probability that one firm 
become unlevered. We arrive to the same conclusion doing Hausman test which reject the 
random effects model. The panel data analysis makes possible to capture the variables behavior 
either in time series either in cross section. Among the three possible models, Pooled 
Regression, Random Effects and Fixed Effects model, we considered appropriate the Fixed 
Effects model
22
. Using the firm Fixed Effects in our Logit regression, almost 50% observations 
dropped because of all positive or all negative outcomes
23
 which is understandable due to a 
certain persistence of leverage classification. Some firms during the period always have shown 
0 or 1 in the dependent variable, maintaining their situation in terms of classification ZNETD or 
non ZNETD. Firms that have not changed their situation, becomes impossible to estimate the 
                                                             
22 The Pooled Regression assumes either the intercept either the regressors don t´ change among firms. The Fixed 
Effects model assumes that the regressors are constant across firms, but the intercepts are different for each one. In 
this case there are not time effects in the regression but only individual effects. These effects may be observable or 
not and are usually correlated with regressors, are endogenous to the model. The Random Effects model assumes that 
if there are effects that are not part of the model, these are exogenous and uncorrelated with the regressors. In order to 
choose between Random and Pooled we should use the Breusch and Pagan (1980) test and in case we reject Pooled 
we have to use Hausman (1978) test to choose between Random and Fixed Effects. In Logit models, using STATA 
and when we fit a random-effects model, the output includes the statistics labeled (rho) which is the proportion of the 
total variance contributed by the panel-level variance component. When rho is zero, the panel variance component is 
unimportant and the panel estimator is no different from the pooled estimator. It was not the case with our model. 
23 A standard Logit panel data package can be used with the dependent variable taking the value one if yit switches 
from 0 to 1 and zero if yit switches from 1 to 0.      
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specific intercept. This smaller sample, keeping only 47,554 observations is different because 
includes only firms that have switched status in some year during the period of time.  
E. Summary Statistics 
The zero net debt firms (ZNETD) are smaller and younger than levered firms (see Table II), 
have higher assets’ volatility and are less diversified. On average ZNETD are less profitable, but 
show a higher Tobin’s Q, more than 1 unit. The marginal tax rate is almost 30% in levered firms 
and near 24% in ZNETD. In figure 2 we can see why average profitability can appear with  
surprising values. Profitability seems to have a nonlinear relation with ZNETD status.   
The incidence of equity issues is much higher in ZNETD, revealing some evidence that 
these firms use more often equity as source of external financing. On average ZNETD show in 
the last two years much higher abnormal returns, comparing with value weighted index, 24.8% 
against 6.8%.  
In terms of assets’ structure, levered firms have a higher percentage in all main asset 
categories: property, plant and equipment, intangibles, receivables and inventories. Conversely, 
ZNETD have a very high percentage of cash and short term investments in their assets, as 
Strebulaev and Yang (2006) also report. Already Faulkender (2002) have also documented that 
cash holdings decrease with size and can be related with financial distress, information 
asymmetry and agency costs. 
The phenomenon’s persistence of debt aversion is not so ephemeral as one might think, but 
has some transitory pattern. After five years, the results are in line with Minton and Wruck 
(2001) considering that our concept of ZNETD is similar to their low leverage firms. After ten 
years still holds in this situation 31% of firms that have choose to be a ZNETD at the beginning. 
This could mean that many firms in a certain year are constrained in their capital structure, 
result of limitations of various types to borrowings or they are in a waiting period, in which they 
are gaining debt capacity. However, ZNETD firms show greater stability in their condition, only 
35% ceased to be after two years and 20.5% of these, have increased debt and become levered. 
A significant fraction of all-equity firms, more than 50% after ten years have disappeared from 
our sample for a wide variety of causes including: bankruptcy, mergers and acquisitions, 
inactivity, significant assets reduction below $10m.  
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III – Empirical Tests and Results 
A. Searching for relevant factors 
In our logit model ZNETD is the dependent variable assuming zero for levered and one for 
unlevered firm. When using the fixed-effects model, the need to estimate a firm dummy lead to 
the rejection of many observations. The remaining sample keeps only with those firms that in 
any year have change from levered to unlevered or the opposite. Thus all fixed-effects 
regressions have much less observations, about 30 000 observations and 3 200 firms less, 
having the advantage as stated in Petersen (2008) of presenting unbiased standard errors. The 
residuals may be also correlated across time. To avoid this problem we introduce dummies to 
control for year effects. Table III shows regressions with robust standard errors, controlling for 
correlation across firms and across time. In Table III we present twenty one variables that are 
defined in appendix A and can contribute to the probability of a firm become unlevered. I have 
run a univariate regression for each one separately. Each line in Table III represents a different 
regression with its pseudo R
2
 and remaining information. 
Volatility 
Volatility24 was used in previous studies in capital structure. Bradley (1984) has arrived to 
the conclusion that there is a negative relation with leverage. Titman and Wessels (1988) have 
included in their study a volatility measure that is the standard deviation of the percentage 
change in operating income and have also obtained a negative relation, although with 
coefficients not statistically significant at conventional significance levels. Friend and Lang 
(1988) have also concluded for a negative relation using as proxy for risk, the standard 
deviation of earnings. Kim and Sorensen (1986) have used a measure that is the coefficient of 
variation in EBIT as a proxy for business risk. Surprisingly they have observed a positive 
relation with leverage25. Kester (1986) have used as a proxy for the volatility or risk, the sum of 
square residuals obtained from regressions for each firm in the five preceding years. The results 
show a negative sign but the coefficients are not statistically significant. More recently, Frank 
and Goyal (2009) have used the variance of stock returns as explanatory variable to the leverage 
ratio in a wide sample of US firms, arriving to a contradictory conclusion. The results show a 
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 With quite different measures: Bradley for example has used a measure which name is variability in firm value. 
This measure is the standard deviation of the first difference in annual earnings scaled by the average value of the 
firm’s total assets over the period. 
25 This study involves only 168 firms in three years. 
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negative correlation with leverage, but the percentage of regressions in which this factor has the 
negative sign is about 30%. I follow bankruptcy literature, mainly Hillegeist et al. (2004) in risk 
measure definition and the results confirm that more volatile assets increase the probability of a 
firm become unlevered. More assets volatility means more costs of financial distress which, 
according to trade-off theory discourages debt issues. Assets volatility has, in all regressions, a 
positive sign, being the most important factor, responsible for a pseudo R2 about 6% in a 
univariate regression with firm fixed effects and time effects. These results are partially 
inconsistent with Gardner and Trzcinka (1992). They have obtained, using  the standard 
deviation of stock returns and Beta in the same logit regression, opposite signs for these two 
variables26. They recognize that the two variables are collinear and when run separately they 
have a positive27 sign in forecasting leverage.  
My results show that unlevered firms recognize in risk and indirectly in the financial 
distress costs the main raison to avoid debt from their capital structure. This evidence is nothing 
new in the context of trade-off theory predictions. However makes clear that is not true the 
argument that this theory doesn’t explain why some profitable firms have low debt or even has 
no debt. The second conclusion is that this special perception of risk and their effects in firm 
value can lead firms to this extreme debt aversion. This evidence comes from the interpretation 
of odds ratio for standard deviation of assets (1,032518). This means that for each 1% increase 
in volatility, the probability of become unlevered increases 3,2%, which means three times 
more. An increase about 31% volatility lead to 100% probability of become unlevered. It is 
important to stress that the coefficient in Table III come from a regression with firm fixed 
effects and year effects, which means that all other unobserved factors are taken in 
consideration. It is also exempt of time series dependence. Including additional variables in the 
regression (see Table V), the coefficient reduces but maintains the odds ratio close to 3%, 
leading to the conclusion that risk doesn’t lose importance even in the presence of other 
variables. To confirm the contribution of each variable in interaction with others we lose 4,6% 
in pseudo R2 when o drop in global regression the standard deviation of assets. 
The number of segments is the second variable that proxies for risk. Its sign is negative and 
confirms the conjecture that diversification reduces risk. In the logit model, the presence of this 
variable reduces the probability of become unlevered. By adding new segments, firms reduce 
                                                             
26 It’s important to note that their measure of risk includes the effects of leverage, when firms are levered. 
27 In Gardner and Trzcinka the dependent variable is zero for unlevered and one for levered. 
27 
 
operating risk and create favorable conditions to debt issue. On the other hand, new business 
means additional financial needs. Following pecking order theory, we expect that firms issue 
debt first. One more segment decreases the probability of become unlevered by 5,7%. 
Scale 
The second most important variable is the ratio of sales over book assets, without cash and 
short term investments28. In table III, considering the univariate regression, with firm fixed 
effects and time effects, we got a pseudo R2 of 4,2% which means 3,1% because time effect 
accounts for 1,1%. In table V, in interaction with other variables, the same importance can be 
extracted. This variable causes an increase in pseudo R2 of 4,2%. Without this variable in 
regression we lose 3,22%. However the coefficient of this variable gains importance in 
interaction with other variables, showing always a positive sign and statistical significance at 
conventional levels. In a within firm regression we can interpret the coefficient of this variable 
as the impact in the probability of become unlevered by the ability to do more business with the 
same assets. 
The quantity of business or the level of activity that a firm can reach with a certain quantity 
of assets, other things equal, is quite important in the probability of become unlevered. First the 
demand of funds, either capital expenditures or working capital, will be lower. Second, more 
business is usually correlated with increasing profitability.  The two situations altogether will 
create favorable conditions to stay in the first step of pecking order theory, using only funds 
generated internally. This variable, proxies for the demand side of funds. When it increases, it 
means low demand and firms are likely to avoid any use of additional debt and even the 
progressively extinction of existing debt. The economic significance of the coefficient in 
univariate regression says that one rotation of assets, causes an increase in the probability of 
become unlevered over than 115%.  
Positive financing deficit 
Including a dummy for firm year with positive financing deficit29 we can observe the impact 
in the probability of becoming unlevered induced by this high free cash flow level. The results 
show a positive sign either in the univariate regression or together with other variables. The 
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 In the definition of this variable we withdraw cash and short term investments. The zero net debt firms carry much 
higher amounts of cash that could distort the significance of this ratio.  
29
 Kayhan and Titman (2007) use a similar variable in their model which tries to find explanations to changes in 
capital structure. 
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coefficient in Table III and Table V doesn’t change too much. This variable belongs to the 
category of financial constraints, or rather their absence. The coefficient and sign corroborate 
also with the idea that the existence of positive financing deficit in a firm year increases the 
probability to become unlevered in the same year with a probability about 127%. This variable 
is approaching the balance between demand and funds supply. This variable shows some 
positive correlation with profitability. When included together with other variables, represents 
the marginal contribution to the probability of one firm that has a positive financial deficit. The 
variable is operating cash-flow net of investments in fixed assets and acquisitions. We have not 
included dividends because they are mathematically related with dependent variable, and I 
prefer to keep them exogenous. 
This finding is not in accordance with Jensen (1986) predictions. Managers of some of these 
firms ignore the role of debt in motivating organization efficiency. However, my findings are 
consistent with pecking order suggestions; firms with positive free cash flow should reduce their 
leverage. Kayan and Titman (2007) have used a similar variable and have also arrived to the 
conclusion that their dummy for negative deficit (firms that raise external capital) is significant 
and has a positive sign in a regression for leverage increase. 
Tobin’s Q 
Market-to-book is one of the most used variables, in capital structure studies. It proxies for 
growth opportunities. Some authors have used other measures but have arrived to the same 
conclusion. The sign obtained in all my regressions is positive and always statistically 
significant at conventional levels. It is consistent with previous studies in capital structure 
literature, using a similar measure Tobin’s Q (market to book ratio of total assets) among others; 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Booth et al. (2001) and Huang and Song (2006). Usually the 
coefficient obtained, regressing leverage in linear models, against market-to-book is negative. 
They are also in accordance with Gardner and Trzcinka (1992) in an all-equity firm research, 
supporting the arguments of Myers (1977) that bondholders lend less to firms with high growth 
options. Conversely, assets-in-place should be financed with more debt than growth 
opportunities. 
It’s important to stress that when taking out market-to-book in a global regression Table V, 
we lose much less in terms of pseudo R2 than the specific R2 in the univariate regression. There 
is some correlation with another variable that is the abnormal return. So we can conclude that 
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both variables capture partially the same effect. This effect is likely more related with market 
acceptance and positive recognition of conservative capital structures ratios. The economic 
significance of one unit increase in Tobin’s Q ratio represents an increase in the probability of 
become unlevered about 32% in univariate regression. 
Tangibility 
In Table III, we can see the univariate regressions using assets structure: Intangibles/Total 
Assets, Property Plant and Equipment/Total Assets, Receivables/Total Assets, Inventories/Total 
Assets and Cash/Total Assets. They present the expected signs and a pseudo R2 very high. This 
figures can lead to the conclusion that the probability of become unlevered is highly determined 
by the absence of fixed assets and intangibles 30 . This also implies that firms with low 
receivables and low inventories are more likely to be unlevered. This is understandable and is in 
line with the conclusions about economies of scale in the use of funds. 
Cash represents an important fraction of assets in all-equity firms, (see Table II) also 
reported by Strebulaev (2006) but cash can’t be considered the cause, the explanation, to the 
unlevered status. High levels of cash can be viewed as a characteristic of financially constrained 
firm, see Acharya et.al (2007). Cash is essential to operate without debt financing. So this 
apparent excess of cash over total assets is also consequence of firm decision or circumstances 
that lead to the no issuance of debt. I consider cash as the other face of the same coin. What I’m 
proposing to explain is what has contributed to this situation of absence of debt and high level 
of cash. It is important to stress also that cash is considered in the construction of dependent 
variable, that is: Short Term Debt plus Long Term Debt minus Cash and Short Term 
Investments. 
Using variables related with asset structure in the context of all-equity firms, like Fixed 
Assets over Book Assets we can arrive to wrong conclusions as can be demonstrated in Table 
IV. When including Property Plant and Equipment/Total Book Assets, Intangibles/Total Book 
Assets, Receivables/Total Book Assets or Inventories/Total Book Assets, as regressors, using a 
within regression (fixed-effects), in the presence of Cash/Total Book Assets, we obtain 
surprising results. Including separately the four variables representing the asset structure (Fixed 
assets, Intangibles, Receivables, Inventories) together with Cash, we don’t have any increase in 
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the pseudo R2. So, is the increasing denominator, influenced by cash that creates the negative 
sign in Table III regressions in this four variables and not the numerator evolution itself.  
Asset structure in each of these four variables can be a source of explanation for different 
capital structure ratios, but their variation has not explanation power to the absence of debt. 
Even that the level of fixed assets can be correlated with leverage in cross section, in fixed 
effects regression, this variable does not influence the likelihood of a firm come to issue debt. In 
order to confirm these results, we have tried to use another variable, corrected for cash, which is 
tangibility without cash (Tang-assetsoutcash). Table III shows that to coefficient to this variable 
is not statistically significant at conventional levels. However this characteristic may be 
included in the firm dummy. In other words, if firms don’t change significantly their asset 
structure, except cash, this variables don’t contribute to the probability of become unlevered. 
So, it’s why we can argue that Fixed Assets, Intangibles, Inventories and Receivables don’t 
have implications in the probability of become unlevered. The apparent contribution is 
completely absorbed by the increasing presence of cash. 
Rate of depreciation 
Kim and Sorensen (1986) have used the average rate of depreciation in their study. I use the 
inverse (Inv-speeddep), on order to get a better economic interpretation to the coefficient. I 
arrive to the same conclusion: the increase in the average depreciation period decreases the 
probability of become unlevered. Long life assets preserve value and suffer less in case of 
financial distress, having lower agency costs. Each additional year in terms of average economic 
life, increases the probability of becoming levered almost 3%.  
Equity Issues 
The variable Equity issues, in the regression Table III, has a positive coefficient and a 
pseudo R
2
 of 1,3%
31
. This is a dummy variable and its coefficient gives the impact in the 
likelihood, in case the firm has issued new equity and this increase was for higher values than 
debt increase. So, the variable tries to capture the change in firm status motivated by managers’ 
decision. Considering that unlevered firms have higher Tobin’s Q, this can corroborate with the 
arguments of Baker and Wurgler (2002). However I’m not saying that unlevered firms are, or 
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have been attempting to time the equity market. The propose of this variable is to check if the 
shift from a levered capital structure is related with seasoned equity offerings (SEO’s).  
Without any relation with other variables we can conclude that the existence of a positive 
net equity issue (new shares minus share repurchase) in a firm year by an amount greater than 
the net debt increase, give us a percentage near 100% likelihood, that the firm will become 
unlevered. This change comes from a managerial decision, nor resulting from prior profitability, 
does neither dictate from financial constraints. Fama and French (2005) show that equity 
decisions often violate the pecking order and equity issuers are not typically under duress. Thus 
the changing to all-equity, can be consequence of an attempt to time the market, managers 
overconfidence and exceptional risk perception, or other motivation not observed. 
In Table V, when we compare the goodness of fit including additional regressors, we are 
controlling for the other effects. In this situation I can say that the change in capital structure to 
all-equity, captured by this variable, is basically the attempt to time the market. The increase in 
pseudo R
2
 resulting from the inclusion of this variable is very small, so that the explanatory 
power of this variable is unimportant. 
Managers overconfidence 
Hovakimian et al. (2001) examine firm financing choices and find that more profitable 
firms have on average lower leverage ratios. In addition they also find that firms with higher 
current stock prices (relative to their past stock prices) are more likely to issue equity rather than 
debt and repurchase debt rather than equity. I use a variable that is not the same of Hovakimian 
(2001). The variable is the excess return during last two years, comparing with value weighted 
index. However we can see some correlation with Tobin’s Q, giving the idea that when firms 
realize better growth opportunities, also experience abnormal returns and both increase the 
probability of become unlevered. Hovakimian et al. (2001), find that high stock returns in the 
year of and the year before the transaction are associated with the issuance of equity, rather than 
debt and the retirement of debt rather the repurchase of equity. The univariate regression in 
Table III, show that the coefficient is statistically significant and the sign is in accordance with 
the predictions of previous studies. Although the pseudo R
2 
is small, only 0,8% considering that 
year effects represent 1,1%. Without interference of any other effect we can say that market 
assigns value and send a positive sign to managers, creating an incentive to the low leverage 
policy. But it remains to investigate whether the presence of other factors the conclusion 
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remains valid. We can hypothesize that the excess return is correlated with other variables, more 
determinants to the change in capital structure. I think it can be the case, because in the global 
regression, the coefficient loose statistical significance at conventional levels. 
Financial constraints 
I use several variables in order to test my conjecture that all-equity firms can be facing 
financial constraints: age, natural logarithmic of booked assets, a dummy for two years of 
negative EBITDA and a dummy for start-up firms. The sign I obtain for log of assets is 
consistent with the financial constraint hypothesis. The negative sign for log of assets means 
that size can work as a barrier to the issuance of debt, due to asymmetric information or due to 
transaction costs. The increase in size decreases the probability of become unlevered. According 
to Hadlock and Pierce (2010) findings, if all-equity firms are financially constrained, I should 
obtain the same sign for age, but it was not the case.  
The sign for age is positive, meaning that in a within regression, where there are only firms 
that have change from one status to the other, firms are likely to change from levered to 
unlevered, when they become older. Nevertheless, in my opinion, it does not mean that younger 
firms are likely to be levered. In a pooled and univariate regression
32
, including firms that have 
not change their status of levered or unlevered
33
, using clustered standard errors by firm, the 
sign is negative. This apparent inconsistency can be consequence of differences between the two 
samples, or can be an indication that not all equity firms are financially constrained. Younger 
firms can be constrained and face difficulties in the issuance of debt and some of them, maintain 
in the sample the all-equity status all the time. This is consistent with Hadlock and Pierce (2010) 
and with the results coming from my pooled regression. When I drop these firms always all-
equity in sample, I keep with those firms that have change from one situation to another and the 
increase in age, following a pecking order style, can lead to the increase of equity, based on 
retained earnings of profitable firms. 
In addition I define a dummy to identify firms with the current and previous year, with 
negative EBITDA, which can proxy for a limited ability to borrow. The sign is the expected and 
the coefficient is significant although the small pseudo R
2
.  
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Another variable is a dummy to define start-up firms which can face severe agency costs of 
debt combined with high growth opportunities. The positive sign obtained in regressions, 
confirms that this type of firms face great difficulties in access to debt and probably it’s why 
these firms are sometimes candidates to venture capital operations. The odds ratio means that 
being start-up, the probability of living without debt is greater than 52%. Including this variable 
with the others in Table V, this likelihood increases. 
Profitability 
Harris and Raviv (1991) document some conflicting findings about the relation between 
profitability and leverage. This is not surprising, since there are conflicting theoretical 
predictions on the effects of profitability on leverage. Meyers and Majluf (1984) predict a 
negative relationship, because firms will prefer to finance with internal funds rather than debt. 
Jensen (1986) predicts a positive one if the market for corporate control is effective and forces 
firms to commit to paying out cash by levering up. If it is ineffective, however managers of 
profitable firms prefer to avoid the disciplinary role of debt, which would lead to a negative 
correlation between profitability and debt.  
Profitable firms face lower expected costs of financial distress and on the supply side, 
suppliers should be more willing to lend to firms with better profitability, due to the strong 
correlation with cash-flow. On the other hand, following trade-off theory, profitable firms 
usually find interest tax shields more valuable. Thus from tax and bankruptcy cost perspectives 
the prediction is that profitable firms will use more debt. Early studies as Friend and Lang 
(1988), Kester
34
 (1986), Titman and Wessels (1988) using similar measures, have found a 
negative relation with profitability and leverage. Rajan and Zingales (1995) also confirmed the 
negative relation with leverage, with the exception of Germany and France where this relation 
does not exist. Furthermore, the negative influence on leverage seems to be quite different 
among firms, becoming stronger as firm size increases. More recently Kayhan and Titman 
(2007) argue that leverage and profitability are negatively related because firms passively 
accumulate profits. Frank and Goyal (2009) have also confirmed the negative relation with 
leverage.  
In some of mentioned studies, profitability and leverage are measured as sample averages. 
In other studies, profitability is a cumulative measure during a certain horizon of time. I use a 
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logit model where profitability is a contemporaneous variable that can influence positively the 
probability of shift from levered to unlevered. The influence of this variable is systematically 
positive and statistically significant, in line with capital structure studies. In terms of pseudo R
2
, 
the explanatory power is relatively small. Even if is true that firms accumulate profits along 
their lives and in consequence, reduce leverage,  the transition from levered status to unlevered, 
may not be only consequence of current year. The remaining question is which horizon should 
we measure or which is the most appropriate to capture the influence of past profitability. It’s 
why I decide to maintain profitability as control variable and introduce others that can account 
for additional marginal effects. The change from levered to unlevered is probably more a 
discrete than a continuous decision. On the other hand, due to different effects of profitability, 
the influence in the likelihood may not be linear, but have a U shape as we can see in figure 2. 
Introducing  variables such as, two years of negative EBITDA and  a dummy for positive 
financing deficit, which are variables that depend largely form profitability, we can see the 
behavior of this firms concerning the probability of becoming unlevered.   
Marginal tax 
Huang and Song (2006), using the average tax rate to measure the tax effect on leverage, 
have concluded for a negative influence from tax. 
My results show the same relationship, contrary to pioneering studies and theories of capital 
structure. There is a positive relation with the probability of becoming unlevered, meaning that 
a marginal tax rate increase does not influence firms to the use of debt. Conversely, firms that 
face higher marginal tax rates are likely to pay debt, retained internal funds or issue equity and 
become unlevered. The positive relation is not surprising, considering the same sign existing 
with profitability and the significant correlation between each other. The pseudo R
2
 due to 
marginal tax rate is near 0,3% in Table III. Similar figure we obtain in regressions in Table V. 
These findings are consistent with the intuition that this variable is also capturing those firms 
that change from levered to unlevered consequence of profit accumulation, which don’t care 
about taxes that are paying. On the other hand, tax shields are not an important factor to explain 
the shift from levered to unlevered situation. 
This is not a surprise, as Graham (2000) had concluded; a typical firm could double tax 
benefits by issuing debt until the marginal tax benefit begins to decline. He also has observed 
that paradoxically, large, liquid, profitable firms with low expected distress costs use debt 
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conservatively. On the other hand, Blouin et al. (2010) had to consider distress costs and other 
variables to reconcile current capital structures.  
Acquisitions 
Mergers and acquisitions, in case of cash payment can create large financing needs, 
surpassing annual retained earnings. This kind of operations may be one of the several discrete 
situations responsible for debt issuance. The results support our conjecture and confirm the 
negative relation with the probability of becoming unlevered. The odds ratio (Table III) means 
that a firm that has payments in its cash flow statement due to acquisitions, is likely to decrease 
by 36% the probability of becoming unlevered. The pseudo R
2
 for this variables in the 
univariate regression with fixed effects and time effects is small (0,5% if we don’t consider time 
effects), which mean that acquisitions can be one cause among others, to the shift from 
unlevered to levered position. 
Industry factors 
This phenomenon of low leverage is quite general and exists in all industries. In Table VI, 
comparing regression 2 with regression 1 we see an increase of 2,6% in pseudo R2, due to 
industry fixed-effects. At the same time, the number of statistically significant dummies
35
, at 5% 
tolerance level, is 25 out of 39. 
In Table VI, regression 3, I have introduced five industry factors which give some 
contribution to the probability of capital structure change. It’s important to stress that in the 
presence of these factors: industry concentration, R&D intensity, renewal ratio, value added, the 
number of statistically significant dummies have decreased to 13. When we removed industry 
dummies and we kept industry factors, in regression 4, the pseudo R
2
 only has decreased by 
0,23%. The above evolution in pseudo R
2
 shows that these factors capture the main industry 
effect on the probability.    
The coefficient for industry concentration is positive and statistically significant, which 
means that in industries dominated by big firms, the probability of becoming unlevered 
increases. This trend can be interpreted in two directions. First, small firms with low market 
share have more difficulties to issue debt. Second, following pecking order, big firms with large 
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market share have more possibilities to accumulate profits and paying debt, although they may 
show lower asymmetric information problems. 
The coefficient for R&D is the most important and its positive sign is consistent with 
previous studies, in capital structure literature
36
. 
In unreported data, the industry renewal ratio is statistically significant without removing 
year effects, and in this case its coefficient is negative. When we remove year effects (Table 
VI), it ceased to be significant and is not statistically different from zero. A high rate of new 
entrants and firms leaving in an industry may be an indication of instability and changeability. 
However can also be a sign of future market growth. Conversely, when this rate is low, may 
indicate industry consolidation if the ratio is determined by one of their plots; the number of 
firms leaving the industry. From one side it can influence positively the unlevered financial 
structure, from the other, can influence negatively. 
The coefficient for industry value added is reliably positive, as expected. Industries with 
low capital intensive have less financing needs. Their business is not dependent from assets 
increase. Business is more dependent from labour force. The results confirm the evidence that 
service based industries, are likely to have more percentage of unlevered firms than 
manufacturing industries. 
IV – Robustness check and additional tests 
In previous section we found that a large number of variables, showing different influences, 
are statistically significant, such as some proxies for financial constraints, risk and others that 
show unlevered firms positively correlated with free cash-flow and profitability. This situation 
confirms my conjecture that some unlevered firms are under duress, more specifically facing 
debt constraints and others probably have chosen and accept this financial structure, convinced 
that running their business without debt or with low debt, is the best decision. I can test this 
hypothesis in another way, using a measure of financial frictions to separate this two 
hypothetically sub-samples. I follow Fama and French (2002) considering that non dividend 
                                                             
36
 This variable has been used in capital structure studies, as a firm characteristic, not at industry level, as far as I 
know. Harris and Raviv (1991), Titman and Wessels (1988)  have documented this negative relation between 
leverage and R&D. 
37 
 
payers are financially constrained
37
. In Table VII, I run alternative logit regressions which 
dependent variable is one if the firm is unlevered and if it pays (not pays dividends). In each 
regression I have dropped the opposite sub-sample, i.e. in regression column 1 table VII, I have 
dropped unlevered firms that don’t pay dividends. 
The two regressions in Table VII, after splitting Zero Net Debt firms between payers and 
nonpayers, show interesting results, confirming the idea that among unlevered firms there are 
two different types. In the first regression, the coefficient for TwoNegEbitda is not statistically 
significant and the coefficient for Ln(assets) have changed its sign to positive. This is consistent 
with the intuition that dividend payers are not financially constrained. The positive sign for 
Ln(assets) show also that size is not a barrier to issue debt, but rather an effect that favors the 
profit accumulation. In line with this interpretation, is the increase for dividend payers, in the 
coefficient for the variable dummy positive financing deficit (PosFinDef). The coefficient for 
dummy acquisitions shows also differences that must be highlighted and consistent with the 
conjecture that nonpayers are under duress. Only in dividend payers, the coefficient is 
statistically significant and higher than in regressions Table V. 
On the other hand, the associated probability with one year increase in the firm age, in the 
two regressions is quite different. This likelihood is 4% for payers, instead of 8% in the case of 
nonpayers, which is consistent with the intuition that the nonpayer status come before payer. 
It is particularly interesting also, the behavior of Tobin’s Q, showing its higher importance 
in the case of dividend payers. My interpretation is that, these firms are more stable and mature 
firms, where growth opportunities are more valuable. Conversely nonpayers, or some of them, 
have more incertitude in their future business. One unity increase in this variable, have an 
impact of 46% in the probability of become unlevered for payers and only an impact of 17% for 
nonpayers. The variable TwoExReturn arises for payers with negative sign, contrary with my 
expectations and showing that a poor evaluation of the market can contribute positively to the 
probability of change from levered to unlevered.  
The increase in pseudo R
2
 comparing Table VII with Table V is also consistent with the 
interpretation that these two sub-samples, payers and nonpayers, are more homogeneous. 
However, these two types of firms have in common, the high perception of risk that is the main 
                                                             
37
 Fazzari et al. (1988) among many others, in financial constraints literature have used a scheme ranking firms based 
on their payout ratio and assign to the financially constrained (unconstrained) group those firms that are in the bottom 
(top) three deciles of annual payout distribution. 
38 
 
cause of unlevered financial structure. The odds ratio continues to show similar influence in the 
probability; 2,7% and 2,9% for each 1% increase in volatility.  
V - Conclusions 
In order to estimate the likelihood of a company becoming unlevered, we use variables that 
support a set of simple ideas. The probability of borrowing increases if more money is needed 
for current operations or even for strategic decisions and decreases if firm produces free cash-
flow. The probability of borrowing decreases if the firm is not in a position to issue debt, 
consequence of severe asymmetric information problems or high agency costs of debt. The 
absence of tax incentives or positive market signs can also influence positively this probability. 
I have tested several variables in order to evaluate this influence on the probability of 
shifting from levered to unlevered capital structure in a firm fixed effects and year effects 
regression. Risk is the most important and reliable factor influencing the zero debt policy. I use 
two proxies: the assets volatility and the number of segments. Both are statistically significant 
and have the expected signs showing a pseudo R
2
 over 6%. Based on odds ratio of standard 
deviation of assets, I can conclude that other variables at their means, 1% increase in volatility, 
increases the probability of shifting to unlevered position by 3%. Giving that average volatility 
in ZNETD firms is 28% higher than overall average and with 30% standard deviation, is 
understandable why we find many firms without debt. This finding can be reconciled with 
trade-off theory if we take in consideration that debt is not the unique source for bankruptcy 
costs. If more risk means more bankruptcy costs and if risk has two sources: assets volatility and 
debt, the use of debt only increases the existing risk. Thus, even with a zero debt policy, the risk 
of assets can create a level of bankruptcy costs that make sub-optimal any debt increase. In 
favor of this interpretation the evidence that marginal tax rate is not important to explain debt 
aversion, showing an opposite sign. This finding is in accordance with some arguments coming 
from pecking order theory, that tax shields are not one of the first order issues on capital 
structure decisions.  
The second most important factor are the economies of scale in the use of funds, leading to 
the conclusion that firms which are able to improve their business with lower assets, are likely 
to become unlevered. This variable proxies for demand side of funds and is consistent with an 
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industry variable that proxies for value added. The statistical significance of these two variables 
corroborate with higher presence of ZNETD firms in service based industries. 
Financial constraint is the third main important factor influencing zero debt policy. I use 
several measures in this category. Some of them try to find barriers to debt issuance: Ln(assets), 
Age, TwoNegEbitda and a dummy for start-up firms. The odds ratios in a global regression 
show very expressive probability influence: 90% when firm has TwoNegEbitda or 230% when 
it is a start-up. The Ln(assets) presents the expected sign, but Age showing a positive sign, is in 
accordance with the opposite reason that justify the shift to a zero debt policy; the financing 
surplus. In a global regression the marginal effect of having a positive financing deficit 
influences the probability of becoming unlevered by 104%. These findings also agree with the 
U shape we have obtained, when analyzing the percentage of ZNETD firms by profitability 
levels. 
In order to analyze the industry influence in zero debt policy, I have computed regressions 
using the same factors removing industry effects and the signs and statistically significance have 
not change. The industry effect is comparatively less important that above factors, representing 
about 2,5% in pseudo R
2
. The main industry effect was captured using observed industry 
variables.  
Following the above findings about financial constraints, I should draw an additional 
conjecture that is: the ZNETD firms are not a homogenous sub-sample. From one side the 
constrained firms and in another side the unconstrained ones, although both are showing a zero 
debt policy. I have tested this hypothesis following Fama French (2002) dividing firms using 
dividend paying criteria. The results show the evidence that in dividend payers and nonpayers 
regressions those variables that proxy for financial constraints have different signs. More 
interesting is the conclusion that risk is the link between these two types of firms that may have 
substantial differences. 
Frank and Goyal (2003) had already concluded that smaller firms did not seem to follow 
the Pecking Order theory in defining its capital structure. Now we can better understand why 
there are other reasons that influence debt equity choice. Should also be noted that since the 
1980s and 1990s much more small businesses appeared publicly traded, comparing to previous 
years. We found that the phenomenon of unlevered firms has more expression in the deciles of 
smaller firms, not being such a unique event for these companies. It also reveals a tendency to 
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spread to larger sizes over the period and has also more expression in service industries and 
more connected to technological side. When we split the unlevered firms in two sub-samples we 
can understand why this phenomenon is not an exclusive characteristic of small firms. 
We believe we have contributed with this study to a better understanding of unlevered 
firms and simultaneously helped clarify the ambiguity in the literature in terms of profitability 
predictions in capital structure.  The Trade-off theory predicts profitable firms should be more 
highly levered to offset corporate taxes.  Also, in many asymmetric information models, is 
predicted that profitable firms will have higher leverage, but Titman and Wessels (1988) and 
Fama and French (2002) show that this is not a common finding.  Fama and French (2002) note 
that the negative relationship between profits and leverage as we have found in high profitable 
firms is consistent with the pecking order theory. But the pecking order is not the only possible 
interpretation of the relationship between profits and leverage as we have tried to demonstrate.  
Fisher et al. (1989) analyze the effect of having fixed costs associated with actively adjusting 
leverage. When a firm earns profits, debt gets paid off and leverage falls automatically. Only 
periodically will large readjustments be made in order to capture the tax benefits of leverage.  
Empirically, most of the data reflects the process of paying off the debt by using profits. We 
have shown that this relationship between leverage and profitability in a broad cross-section, 
instead of being linear and negative, may be non-linear, positive in lower profitability levels and 
negative in higher profitability levels. 
Finally it's important to stress that other variables may also influence firms with similar 
characteristics in terms of the variables used, to choose different capital structures. From those, 
there are variables related to corporate capital structure, agency costs and ownership control. 
However we think that to articulate and treating this kind of variables in a sample as wide as 
that which we have used, becomes almost impossible.  
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Appendix A -Variables Description 
Variables Category -Proxy Definition Expect. 
Sign 
Dummy positive 
financing deficit: 
PosFinDef 
Cash Flow production 
– financial constraint 
FD = oancf-capx-aqc (items from Cash Flow 
Statement) 
Oancf =Operating Activities – Net Cash Flow; 
Capx=Capital Expenditures 
Aqc=Acquisitions 
(1)If FD is positive (0) otherwise 
+ 
Standard deviation of 
assets: 
SD-assets 
Market Risk σE =Standard deviation of stock based on daily returns 
from CRSP 
VE = Current market value of equity 
X = Face value of debt 
Standard deviation of assets= σA 
 σA=σE.VE/(VE+X)  
+ 
Number of segments Risk Number of business units by market or by product - 
2years excess returns: 
TwoExReturn 
Managers 
Overconfidence 
Difference between Daily returns with dividends and  
Value-weighted market portfolio (excluding American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs)) NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq.  
+ 
Tobin’s Q Growth opportunities (Book assets + Market value of equity-Book value of 
equity) /Book assets 
+ 
EBIT–to-assets Profitability Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/Book Assets +/- 
Age: years database Financial Constraints Based on first year firm appears in Compustat file - 
Dummy 2years negative 
Ebitda: 
TwoNegEbitda 
Financial 
distress/Financial 
Constraints 
Dummy (1) if firm has last two years of negative 
ebitda, (0) otherwise. 
+ 
Dummy Start-up: 
Start-up 
Financial Constraints Dummy (1) if firm belongs to the lowest quintile of 
(sales/total assets) in their industry by year. Industry 
defined by 2 digit SIC code. 
+ 
Ln (assets) Financial Constraints Natural logarithm of book assets - 
Dummy acquisitions: 
Acquisitions 
Special opportunity to 
issue debt 
Dummy (1) if firm in current year spent money in 
acquisitions, over than 1% of their assets (aqc/at>1%), 
(0) otherwise, using data from Cash Flow Statement.  
- 
Equity issues Market timing Dummy (1) if firm issued equity in current year and 
equity issued>debt issued, (0) otherwise. Equity issued 
is net of stock repurchases and debt issued is long term 
and short term and net repayments. All data come from 
Cash Flow Statement. 
+ 
Sale-assetsoutcash Scale Sales/(Total book assets without cash and short term 
investments) 
+ 
Marginal tax rate Tax shields Marginal tax rates
38 and when missing, were replaced 
by the ratio Income taxes/Pretax income (txt/pi) 
- 
PPE-to-assets Agency costs of debt Property plant and equipment/(Total book assets 
without cash and short term investments) 
- 
Inv-speeddep Agency costs of debt 
- Type of fixed assets 
Property plant and equipment/ Annual depreciation: 
ppent/(dp-am). If am is missing, change to zero. 
+ 
Industry concentration  Industry  competition Percentage of sales in each industry by year that 
correspond to 30% of biggest firms.  
+ 
Industry renewal ratio Industry 
characteristics –future 
growth 
(Number of first year firms + Number of last year 
firms) / total firms in industry year Compustat 
databases 
+/- 
Industry value added Value added gp/sale average by industry, by year.  + 
Industry R&D intensity Financial distress 
costs 
By industry, by year, total R&D expenses divided by 
sales. If R&D is missing, were replaced by zero. 
+ 
                                                             
38 The Marginal Tax Rates database was created by Dr. Jennifer Blouin (The Wharton School), Dr. John Core 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology), and Dr. Wayne Guay (The Wharton School) using Capital IQ Compustat 
data.  These rates correspond to the non-parametric marginal tax rates developed in the article: Have the Tax Benefits 
of Debt Been Overestimated? Journal of Financial Economics 2010, 98(2); 195-213. 
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Appendix B – Cash Flow Definitions  
The codes below come from Compustat file in Wrds datasets. 
 
OPERATING ACTIVITIES  Codes: 
Income Before Extraordinary Items   IBC 
Extraordinary Items and Discontinued Operations   XIDOC 
Depreciation and Amortization          DPC 
Deferred Taxes                   TXDC 
Equity in Net Loss (Earnings)  ESUBC 
Sale of PP&E and Investments - (Gain) Loss   SPPIV 
Funds from Operations - Other TXBCO+FOPOX FOPO 
 Excess Tax Benefit of Stock Options - Cash Flow Operating  TXBCO 
 Funds from Operations - Other excluding Option Tax Benefit  FOPOX 
Accounts Receivable - Decrease (Increase)  RECCH 
Inventory - Decrease (Increase)  INVCH 
Accounts Payable and Accrued Liabilities - Increase (Decrease)  APALCH 
Income Taxes - Accrued - Increase (Decrease)  TXACH 
Assets and Liabilities - Other (Net Change)  AOLOCH 
Operating Activities - Net Cash Flow IBC + DPC + XIDOC + TXDC 
+ ESUBC + SPPIV + FOPO + 
RECCH + INVCH + APALCH 
+ TXACH + AOLOCH= 
OANCF 
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Figure 1-The two types of unlevered firms 
All-equity firms are firms that follow a zero debt policy. In this figure all-equity firms are the ZNETD firms and 
levered firms the opposite. ZNETD firms are firms that have negative net debt in a given year, i.e., (DLC+DLTT-
CHE≤0). The numbers 1,2,3, represent movements from one condition to the other, motivated for different raisons. 
The movement 1 can be consequence of removing financial constraints. The movement 2 can be consequence of 
good performance combined with the tendency of managers to maintain or delay the exit of funds and following a 
pecking order style, may lead to accelerate equity growth to total or partial debt extinction. This equity growth can be 
influenced positively by high efficiency in the use of funds as well as consequence of market timing. The movement 
3 can represent in influence of some strategic moves like diversification and more specifically acquisitions. 
Movements 2 and 3 can be caused also by changes in risk perception and changes in costs of financial distress. 
 
 
All-equity firms 
Type I          Type II 
Levered Firms 
1 3 2 
Figure 2 – ZNETD frequency and dividend payers by profitability vigintiles 
In this figure, firms are distributed over 20 profitability vigintiles. In each vigintile is represented the percentage of 
ZNETD firms and the percentage dividend paying firms. ZNETD firms are firms that have no positive net debt in a 
given year, i.e., (DLC+DLTT-CHE≤0). Profitability is defined by EBIT over Total Book Assets. The profitability 
levels representing 20 equal number of firms are arbitrary. 
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Table I - Frequency of Zero-Leverage Firms 
ZD firms are firms that have zero long-term debt and short-term debt (DLC+DLTT=0). ZLTD firms are firms that 
have zero long-term debt (DLTT=0). ZNETD firms are firms that have negative net debt in a given year, i.e., 
(DLC+DLTT-CHE≤0). Columns 1 to 4 give the fraction of ZD, ZLTD and ZNETD firms relative to the total sample 
in each year. Column 5 presents the number N of firms of the whole sample in each year.  
Fiscal Year ZD ZLTD ZNETD N
1987 7.1% 9.7% 31.0% 2700
1988 6.6% 9.2% 30.1% 2649
1989 7.5% 10.2% 29.6% 2636
1990 8.5% 11.0% 30.8% 2758
1991 9.4% 11.8% 34.2% 2957
1992 10.5% 13.3% 36.3% 3206
1993 11.8% 14.5% 37.8% 3395
1994 12.0% 14.7% 36.9% 3609
1995 12.5% 15.6% 37.8% 4018
1996 13.6% 16.5% 41.1% 4110
1997 14.3% 17.1% 42.3% 4040
1998 14.9% 18.2% 42.2% 4103
1999 14.4% 17.6% 41.8% 3872
2000 15.1% 18.1% 43.5% 3650
2001 16.0% 18.4% 44.7% 3475
2002 16.6% 19.1% 45.7% 3478
2003 18.4% 20.7% 47.8% 3475
2004 19.3% 21.3% 48.8% 3454
2005 20.2% 22.5% 49.8% 3426
2006 19.9% 22.1% 48.6% 3316
2007 19.1% 21.8% 48.1% 3186
2008 17.8% 21.3% 44.6% 3045
2009 19.3% 22.7% 49.0% 2884
Average 14.1% 16.8% 41.0%
Total 77442
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Table II – Summary statistics 
This table shows summary statistics. ZNETD firms are firms that have negative net debt in a given year, i.e., (DLC+DLTT-CHE≤0). Data come from Compustat file from 1987 to 2009. 
Data was winsorized at 0,5% percentile each tail. 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SD-assets 38053 34.973 21.405 28148 62.789 30.445 66201 46.800 29.096 5.355 177.717
Segments 45122 4.252 2.419 31749 3.723 2.144 76871 4.033 2.324 1 31
EBIT-to-assets 45421 0.058 0.176 32018 -0.011 0.287 77439 0.030 0.231 -1.711 0.463
Tobin's Q 41291 1.630 1.132 29670 2.738 2.362 70961 2.094 1.838 0.521 15.770
Ln(assets) 45423 6.095 1.997 32019 4.927 1.662 77442 5.612 1.952 -4.248 13.656
Age 45423 18.531 14.686 32019 12.969 10.993 77442 16.231 13.564 1 60
TwoNegEbitda 45423 0.047 0.212 32019 0.213 0.409 77442 0.116 0.320 0 1
Start-up 45423 0.180 0.384 32019 0.247 0.431 77442 0.208 0.406 0 1
PosFinDef 45423 0.421 0.494 32019 0.496 0.500 77442 0.452 0.498 0 1
Acquisitions 45423 0.284 0.451 32019 0.182 0.386 77442 0.242 0.428 0 1
Sale-assetsoutcash 45422 1.353 0.899 31957 1.688 1.089 77379 1.492 0.995 0.071 5.469
Equity issues 45423 0.139 0.346 32019 0.321 0.467 77442 0.214 0.410 0 1
Marginal tax rate 45419 0.297 0.105 32019 0.242 0.131 77438 0.274 0.120 0 0.51
TwoExReturn 37266 0.068 0.697 26069 0.248 0.838 63335 0.142 0.764 -1.951 3.164
PPE-to-assets 45302 0.353 0.241 31973 0.177 0.159 77275 0.280 0.228 0.003 0.924
RECEIV-to-assets 45099 0.180 0.135 31838 0.168 0.131 76937 0.175 0.133 0 0.718
INVENT-to-assets 44914 0.156 0.158 31766 0.103 0.121 76680 0.134 0.146 0 0.725
ITAN-to-assets 40073 0.147 0.184 28256 0.083 0.134 68329 0.121 0.168 0 0.765
CASH-to-assets 45423 0.060 0.081 31959 0.364 0.232 77382 0.186 0.220 0 0.929
Inv-speeddep 45181 8.292 5.858 31825 5.362 4.700 77006 7.081 5.599 0.649 36.087
Tang-assetsoutcash 45301 0.375 0.253 31942 0.283 0.213 77243 0.337 0.241 0 1
NonZNETD ZNETD All Firms
 
 
                                       
Table III – Core factor selection using ZNETD as dependent variable with firm fixed effects and time effects 
This table shows line by line univariate regressions run using firm fixed effects and time effects. The logistic 
regression model for the dependent variable is zero for levered and one for ZNETD. ZNETD firms are firms that 
have negative net debt in a given year, i.e., (DLC+DLTT-CHE≤0). Data come from Compustat file from 1987 to 
2009. Regressions were run using panel data models on the following independent variables that are defined in 
Appendix A. Odds ratio is calculated by EXP(Coef.) and (odds ratio -1) give us the percentage increase in the chance 
of a firm become unlevered (ZNETD), when the independent variable increases a unit comparing when it remains 
stable. Numbers in parenthesis indicate t-statistics. Pseudo R2 is calculated using the difference for log likelihood 
(null). ***, ** and * mean statistically different from zero at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Coefficient t-stat obs ll(null) ll(model) Own R
2
Odds
Estimate Ratio
SD-assets 0.032
***
(37.80) 36275 -15113.1 -14048.3 0.070 1.033
EBIT-to-assets 0.013
***
(18.33) 47552 -19507.6 -19113.4 0.020 1.013
Segments -0.058
***
(-7.34) 47101 -19341.6 -19117.9 0.012 0.943
Tobin's Q 0.274
***
(24.37) 40303 -16812.9 -16236.6 0.034 1.315
Tang-assetsoutcash -0.018 (-0.16) 47264 -19404.8 -19183.5 0.011 0.982
Inv-speeddep -0.028
***
(-8.58) 47105 -19339.1 -19080 0.013 0.972
Age 0.024
***
(5.98) 47554 -19507.9 -19293.1 0.011 1.024
Ln(assets) -0.145
***
(-8.94) 47554 -19507.9 -19252.7 0.013 0.865
TwoNegEbitda 0.440
***
(9.17) 47554 -19507.9 -19250.8 0.013 1.553
Start-up 0.423
***
(10.99) 47554 -19507.9 -19232.3 0.014 1.527
PosFinDef 0.822
***
(30.96) 47554 -19507.9 -18797.1 0.036 2.275
Acquisitions -0.448
***
(-14.79) 47554 -19507.9 -19200.5 0.016 0.639
Sale-assetsoutcash 0.767
***
(32.31) 47304 -19424.5 -18610.2 0.042 2.153
Equity issues 0.696
***
(22.94) 47554 -19507.9 -19043.1 0.024 2.006
Marginal tax rate 1.606
***
(11.54) 47551 -19507.9 -19225.3 0.014 4.983
TwoExReturn 0.399
***
(22.83) 35167 -14651.3 -14378.6 0.019 1.490
INTAN-to-assets -5.456
***
(-39.61) 40731 -16736.2 -15602.1 0.068 0.004
PPE-to-assets -7.113
***
(-46.02) 47411 -19447.9 -17895.7 0.080 0.001
RECEIV-to-assets -4.777
***
(-29.07) 47173 -19367 -18686.9 0.035 0.008
INVENT-to-assets -7.093
***
(-32.96) 46913 -19266.1 -18423.7 0.044 0.001
CASH-to-assets 18.416
***
(80.92) 47305 -19425.6 -11346.4 0.416 99533019  
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Table IV - Logit Regressions on zero net debt firms (ZNETD) using asset structure factors in fixed effects 
This table shows the relative importance of tangibility of assets and other components of total assets in the presence 
of CASH. The logistic regression model for the dependent variable is zero for levered and one for ZNETD. ZNETD 
firms are firms that have negative net debt in a given year, i.e., (DLC+DLTT-CHE≤0). Data come from Compustat 
file from 1987 to 2009. Regressions were run using panel data models on the following independent variables: 
CASH-to-assets is cash and short term investments divided by total book assets, PPE-to-assets is property plant & 
equipment divided by total book assets, INTAN-to-assets is total intangibles divided by total book assets, RECEIV-
to-assets is total receivables divided by total book assets, INVENT-to-assets is total inventories divided by total book 
assets. Variables have been included together with CASH and the results should be compared with univariate 
regression in Table III. Numbers in parenthesis indicate t-statistics. Pseudo R2 is calculated using the difference for 
log likelihood (null). ***, ** and * mean statistically different from zero at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Assets structure (1) (2) (3) (4)
CASH-to-assets 17.969
***
17.812
***
18.951
***
18.676
***
(77.77) (72.23) (80.48) (79.29)
PPE-to-assets -1.935
***
(-9.88)
INTAN-to-assets -1.325
***
(-7.73)
RECEIV-to-assets 2.479
***
(11.11)
INVENT-to-assets 1.096
***
(4.03)
Firm Fixed-effects yes yes yes yes
Year-effects yes yes yes yes
obs 47265 40665 47086 46810
groups 3549 3291 3545 3526
ll(null) -19405.9 -16715.4 -19343.4 -19238.8
ll(model) -11283.4 -9795.92 -11236.7 -11215.9
Pseudo R2 0.419 0.414 0.419 0.417  
 
 
 
 
 
Table V – Logit Regressions on zero net debt firms (ZNETD) and partial contributions in fixed effects 
This table shows the relative importance and the contribution of each factor when entering in the logistic regression. 
The logistic regression model for the dependent variable is zero for levered and one for ZNETD. ZNETD firms are 
firms that have negative net debt in a given year, i.e., (DLC+DLTT-CHE≤0). Data come from Compustat file from 
1987 to 2009. Regressions were run using panel data models on the following independent variables that are defined 
in Appendix A. Variables have been included in regressions following their category and by descending order of 
importance in Table III. To double check the importance of each variable, regression 7 was run consecutively without 
(n-1) variables and calculated pseudo R2 difference. Doing Hausman test, Random Effects model was rejected and 
we have chosen Fixed Effects. Odds ratio is calculated by EXP(Coef.) and (odds ratio -1) give us the percentage 
increase in the chance of a firm become unlevered (ZNETD), when the independent variable increases a unit 
comparing when it remains stable. Numbers in parenthesis indicate t-statistics. Pseudo R2 is calculated using the 
difference for log likelihood (null). ***, ** and * mean statistically different from zero at 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively.  
Odds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Ratio
SD-assets 0.033
*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 1.030
(37.82) (33.48) (32.84) (31.32) (31.80) (31.41) (30.25)
Segments -0.089
***
-0.067
***
-0.060
***
-0.062
***
-0.056
***
-0.057
***
-0.063
***
0.939
(-9.46) (-6.91) (-6.09) (-6.17) (-5.58) (-5.64) (-6.11)
Age 0.021
***
0.019
***
0.021
***
0.028
***
0.030
***
0.047
***
1.048
(3.95) (3.54) (3.77) (5.11) (5.45) (7.89)
Ln(assets) -0.364
***
-0.093
***
-0.023 -0.113
***
-0.102
***
-0.110
***
0.896
(-13.83) (-3.32) (-0.79) (-3.83) (-3.44) (-3.40)
TwoNegEbitda -0.050 0.209
***
0.187
***
0.565
***
0.553
***
0.640
***
1.896
(-0.75) (2.98) (2.64) (7.44) (7.25) (7.99)
Start-up 0.581
***
1.184
***
1.170
***
1.217
***
1.218
***
1.194
***
3.300
(11.70) (21.92) (21.40) (22.14) (22.10) (20.76)
PosFinDef 0.985
***
0.770
***
0.782
***
0.738
***
0.718
***
0.712
***
2.038
(30.81) (23.19) (23.29) (21.82) (21.15) (19.82)
Sale-assetsoutcash 1.352
***
1.294
***
1.172
***
1.178
***
1.199
***
3.317
(33.09) (30.97) (27.88) (27.95) (26.93)
Tobin's Q 0.244
***
0.232
***
0.222
***
0.201
***
1.223
(17.53) (16.98) (16.24) (12.93)
Inv-speeddep 0.006 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005
(1.32) (-0.34) (-0.26) (-0.95)
EBIT-to-assets 1.852
***
1.822
***
1.564
***
4.778
(14.08) (13.79) (10.78)
Equity issues 0.432
***
0.391
***
1.478
(11.28) (9.81)
Acquisitions -0.102
**
0.903
(-2.52)
Marginal tax rate 2.468
***
11.799
(9.88)
TwoExReturn 0.017
(0.70)
Firm Fixed-effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year-effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
obs 36073 36073 35996 35811 35811 35811 33607
groups 2674 2674 2670 2661 2661 2671 2479
ll(null) -15031.02 -15031.02 -15011.05 -14940.41 -14940.41 -14940.41 -13996.97
ll(model) -13924.88 -13290.79 -12584.25 -12350.53 -12251.81 -12187.76 -11413.44
Pseudo R2 7.36% 11.58% 16.17% 17.33% 18.00% 18.42% 18.46%
Pseudo R2 increase 7.36% 4.22% 4.59% 1.17% 0.66% 0.43% 0.03%
Dependent Variable: Zero Net Debt (ZNETD)
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 Table VI - Logit Regressions on zero net debt firms (ZNETD) using industry effects 
This table shows the relative importance and the contribution of industry factors. The logistic regression model for 
the dependent variable is zero for levered and one for ZNETD. ZNETD firms are firms that have negative net debt in 
a given year, i.e., (DLC+DLTT-CHE≤0). Data come from Compustat file from 1987 to 2009. Regressions were run 
using panel data models on the following independent variables that are defined in Appendix A. Numbers in 
parenthesis indicate t-statistics. Pseudo R2 is calculated using the difference for log likelihood (null). ***, ** and * 
mean statistically different from zero at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SD-assets 0.041
***
0.038
***
0.041
***
0.042
***
(42.37) (39.86) (39.77) (39.85)
Segments -0.052
***
-0.062
***
-0.074
***
-0.072
***
(-5.37) (-6.43) (-7.40) (-7.29)
Age -0.035
***
-0.020
***
-0.020
***
-0.021
***
(-10.06) (-5.85) (-5.85) (-6.35)
Ln(assets) -0.261
***
-0.183
***
-0.179
***
-0.185
***
(-11.22) (-7.83) (-7.40) (-7.73)
TwoNegEbitda 0.981
***
0.872
***
0.783
***
0.797
***
(12.66) (11.24) (9.20) (9.37)
Start-up 1.283
***
1.358
***
1.269
***
1.275
***
(23.94) (25.02) (22.23) (22.41)
PosFinDef 0.748
***
0.744
***
0.748
***
0.748
***
(21.48) (21.28) (20.88) (20.91)
Sale-assetsoutcash 0.898
***
1.088
***
1.098
***
1.100
***
(26.44) (30.25) (30.37) (30.96)
Tobin's Q 0.331
***
0.280
***
0.336
***
0.338
***
(20.98) (18.19) (18.69) (18.83)
Inv-speeddep -0.053
***
-0.027
***
-0.037
***
-0.038
***
(-11.40) (-5.87) (-7.22) (-7.47)
EBIT-to-assets 1.906
***
1.875
***
1.917
***
1.917
***
(13.79) (13.61) (11.23) (11.24)
Equity issues 0.534
***
0.500
***
0.493
***
0.491
***
(13.76) (12.87) (12.26) (12.20)
Acquisitions -0.119
***
-0.149
***
-0.143
***
-0.136
***
(-3.08) (-3.80) (-3.59) (-3.41)
Marginal tax rate 1.601
***
2.003
***
2.389
***
2.360
***
(6.92) (8.58) (9.78) (9.68)
TwoExReturn -0.096
***
-0.071
***
-0.109
***
-0.106
***
(-4.02) (-2.98) (-4.32) (-4.20)
Industry concentration 0.046
***
0.032
***
(4.32) (3.75)
Industry R&D intensity 26.558
***
27.503
***
(22.84) (28.14)
Industry renewal ratio -0.118 0.027
(-0.21) (0.05)
Industy value added 4.696
***
4.051
***
(16.35) (16.29)
Random-effects yes yes yes yes
Year-effects yes yes yes yes
Industry Fixed-effects no yes yes no
obs 61746 61746 59219 59219
groups 6353 6353 6247 6247
ll(null) -25970.95 -25970.95 -24840.4 -24840.4
ll(model) -21773.91 -21101.86 -20106.76 -20162.01
Pseudo R2 16.16% 18.75% 19.06% 18.83%
Dependent Variable: Zero Net Debt (ZNETD)
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Table VII – Logit Regressions on zero net debt firms (ZNETD) dividend payers and nonpayers 
This table shows different results to the same regression, dividing ZNETD firms in two sub-samples: ZNETD firms 
that pay dividends and ZNETD that don’t pay dividends. In regression column l the dependent variable is zero for 
levered (NonZNETD) and one for ZNETD payers and in column 2 the dependent variable is zero for levered 
(NonZNETD) and one for ZNETD nonpayers. ZNETD firms are firms that have negative net debt in a given year, 
i.e., (DLC+DLTT-CHE≤0). Data come from Compustat file from 1987 to 2009. Regressions were run using panel 
data models on the following independent variables that are defined in Appendix A. Odds ratio is calculated by 
EXP(Coef.) and (odds ratio -1) give us the percentage increase in the chance of a firm become unlevered (ZNETD), 
when the independent variable increases a unit comparing when it remains stable. Numbers in parenthesis indicate t -
statistics. Pseudo R2 is calculated using the difference for log likelihood (null). ***, ** and * mean statistically 
different from zero at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
Dividend Odds Nonpayers Odds
Payers Ratio Ratio
SD-assets 0.027
***
1.027 0.029
***
1.029
(12.13) (26.97)
Segments -0.081
***
0.922 -0.050
***
0.951
(-4.60) (-3.98)
Age 0.040
***
1.041 0.078
***
1.081
(4.24) (10.11)
Ln(assets) 0.201
***
1.223 -0.288
***
0.750
(3.02) (-7.69)
TwoNegEbitda -0.208 0.605
***
1.831
(-0.69) (7.32)
Start-up 0.848
***
2.335 1.347
***
3.846
(7.58) (20.23)
PosFinDef 0.862
***
2.368 0.629
***
1.876
(14.09) (14.53)
Sale-assetsoutcash 1.953
***
7.050 0.994
***
2.702
(19.49) (20.57)
Tobin's Q 0.377
***
1.458 0.160
***
1.174
(9.32) (9.75)
Inv-speeddep 0.005 -0.007
(0.44) (-1.38)
EBIT-to-assets 1.059
**
2.883 1.544
***
4.683
(2.15) (10.12)
Equity issues 0.256
***
1.292 0.472
***
1.603
(3.63) (9.99)
Acquisitions -0.246
***
0.782 -0.026
(-3.59) (-0.53)
Marginal tax rate 4.042
***
56.940 2.536
***
12.629
(7.10) (9.22)
TwoExReturn -0.095
*
0.909 0.041
(-1.70) (1.56)
Firm Fixed-effects yes yes
Year-effects yes yes
obs 12895 23325
groups 895 1951
ll(null) -5159.896 -9548.251
ll(model) -4078.778 -7678.006
Pseudo R2 20.95% 19.59%  
